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Frequent Auctions for Intraday Electricity Markets

Author

Listed:
  • Christoph Graf
  • Thomas Kuppelwieser
  • David Wozabal

Abstract

Continuous trading is currently becoming the standard for intraday electricity markets. In this paper, we propose frequent auctions as a viable alternative. We argue that batching orders in auctions potentially leads to lower liquidity cost, more reliable, less noisy price signals, and allows for better alignment of market outcomes with the technical realities of the transmission grid. In an empirical study, we compare the German continuous intraday market with counterfactual outcomes from frequent auctions. We find that traded volumes tend to be higher for continuous trading; however, the auction market benefits from lower liquidity costs and less noisy price signals. Furthermore, we critically discuss the suitability of continuous trading in the presence of network constraints and technical restrictions of conventional units. Taken together these findings suggest that in sparsely traded intraday markets, pooling orders in frequent auctions may be beneficial.

Suggested Citation

  • Christoph Graf & Thomas Kuppelwieser & David Wozabal, 2024. "Frequent Auctions for Intraday Electricity Markets," The Energy Journal, , vol. 45(1), pages 231-256, January.
    • Handle: RePEc:sae:enejou:v:45:y:2024:i:1:p:231-256
    DOI: 10.5547/01956574.45.1.cgra
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    References listed on IDEAS

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    1. Simon Hagemann & Christoph Weber, 2013. "An Empirical Analysis of Liquidity and its Determinants in The German Intraday Market for Electricity," EWL Working Papers 1317, University of Duisburg-Essen, Chair for Management Science and Energy Economics, revised Oct 2013.
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    3. Lauterbach, Beni, 2001. "A note on trading mechanism and securities' value: The analysis of rejects from continuous trade," Journal of Banking & Finance, Elsevier, vol. 25(2), pages 419-430, February.
    4. Chelley-Steeley, Patricia, 2009. "Price synchronicity: The closing call auction and the London stock market," Journal of International Financial Markets, Institutions and Money, Elsevier, vol. 19(5), pages 777-791, December.
    5. Eric Budish & Peter Cramton & John Shim, 2015. "Editor's Choice The High-Frequency Trading Arms Race: Frequent Batch Auctions as a Market Design Response," The Quarterly Journal of Economics, President and Fellows of Harvard College, vol. 130(4), pages 1547-1621.
    6. Rainer Baule & Michael Naumann, 2021. "Volatility and Dispersion of Hourly Electricity Contracts on the German Continuous Intraday Market," Energies, MDPI, vol. 14(22), pages 1-24, November.
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