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Effects of Privatization on Price and Labor Efficiency: The Swedish Electricity Distribution Sector

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  • Erik Lundin

Abstract

I examine the effects of privatization, in the form of acquisitions, in the Swedish electricity distribution sector. As the majority of the distribution networks have remained publicly owned, I use a synthetic control method to identify the effects on price and labor efficiency. In comparison to their synthetic counterparts, I find that the acquired networks increased labor efficiency by 8-18 percent depending on model specification, while no effect is found on price. Thus, the evidence suggests economically meaningful efficiency gains but that these are not fed through to consumer prices. Robustness results using a conventional difference-in-differences estimator largely confirms the results, although the estimated efficiency gains are either comparable to or less pronounced than their synthetic control counterparts.

Suggested Citation

  • Erik Lundin, 2020. "Effects of Privatization on Price and Labor Efficiency: The Swedish Electricity Distribution Sector," The Energy Journal, , vol. 41(2), pages 247-274, March.
  • Handle: RePEc:sae:enejou:v:41:y:2020:i:2:p:247-274
    DOI: 10.5547/01956574.41.2.elun
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    Cited by:

    1. Söderberg, Magnus & Vesterberg, Mattias, 2023. "How demand uncertainty influences electricity network prices under revenue-cap regulation: The case of Sweden," Energy Economics, Elsevier, vol. 127(PB).
    2. Vesterberg, Mattias & Zhou, Wenchao & Lundgren, Tommy, 2021. "Wind of change: Small-scale electricity production and distribution-grid efficiency in Sweden," Utilities Policy, Elsevier, vol. 69(C).
    3. Hou, Zheng & Roseta-Palma, Catarina & Ramalho, Joaquim J.S., 2024. "Can operational efficiency in the Portuguese electricity sector be improved? Yes, but..," Energy Policy, Elsevier, vol. 190(C).

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    More about this item

    Keywords

    Incentive regulation; Electricity distribution; Natural monopoly; Norm model regulation; Privatization; acquisitions;
    All these keywords.

    JEL classification:

    • L33 - Industrial Organization - - Nonprofit Organizations and Public Enterprise - - - Comparison of Public and Private Enterprise and Nonprofit Institutions; Privatization; Contracting Out
    • L52 - Industrial Organization - - Regulation and Industrial Policy - - - Industrial Policy; Sectoral Planning Methods
    • L94 - Industrial Organization - - Industry Studies: Transportation and Utilities - - - Electric Utilities

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