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Quantifying European Legislative Research

Author

Listed:
  • Thomas König

    (German University of Administrative Sciences, Speyer, Germany)

  • Brooke Luetgert

    (German University of Administrative Sciences, Speyer, Germany)

  • Tanja Dannwolf

    (University of Mannheim, Germany)

Abstract

Research on European legislative decision-making has entered a stage of quantitative analysis. The quantitative approach promises to advance the current dialogue by allowing for the evaluation of competing approaches across multiple policy domains and over time. At the same time, the quantitative study of EU decision-making introduces a number of drawbacks: it is difficult to identify one definitive source for legislative information, and case-level data are not directly accessible in a machine-readable format. In order to identify the most crucial pitfalls and provide a reliable data source, we evaluate the most frequently cited, publicly available EU legislative database, CELEX, and compare it with a less publicized legislative database referred to as PreLex. We find that CELEX documents legislative events, whereas PreLex records inter-institutional activities in the legislative process. Unsurprisingly, each of these databases has particular advantages, and we discuss which of the two might be better suited for the analysis of specific research questions.

Suggested Citation

  • Thomas König & Brooke Luetgert & Tanja Dannwolf, 2006. "Quantifying European Legislative Research," European Union Politics, , vol. 7(4), pages 553-574, December.
    • Handle: RePEc:sae:eeupol:v:7:y:2006:i:4:p:553-574
    DOI: 10.1177/1465116506069444
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    References listed on IDEAS

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    1. Alberto Alesina & Ignazio Angeloni & Ludger Schuknecht, 2005. "What does the European Union do?," Public Choice, Springer, vol. 123(3), pages 275-319, June.
    2. Bernard Steunenberg & Dieter Schmidtchen & Christian Koboldt, 1999. "Strategic Power in the European Union," Journal of Theoretical Politics, , vol. 11(3), pages 339-366, July.
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    Cited by:

    1. Thomas König & Bernd Luig, 2014. "Ministerial gatekeeping and parliamentary involvement in the implementation process of EU directives," Public Choice, Springer, vol. 160(3), pages 501-519, September.

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