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Can the EU Anchor Policy Reform in Third Countries?

Author

Listed:
  • Alfred Tovias

    (Hebrew University of Jerusalem, Israel)

  • Mehmet Ugur

    (University of Greenwich, UK)

Abstract

The emerging literature on ‘anchoring’ draws attention to non-conventional benefits of regional integration arrangements, which include increased policy credibility. Nevertheless, this literature tends to view the anchoring of policy reform as an exogenously given option for a reforming country. We demonstrate that anchoring is an endogenously determined choice, which may guarantee neither optimal levels of policy reform nor effective anchoring unless the relevant contracts are both complete and incentive compatible. We examine the economic pillar of the Euro-Med Partnership (EMP) to ascertain the extent to which its contractual provisions satisfy these conditions. Our findings suggest that the EMP leaves too much room for discretion and does not internalize the positive externalities associated with policy reform. These findings enable us to elaborate on why the EU cannot be expected to function as an effective anchor for policy reform for its trading partners.

Suggested Citation

  • Alfred Tovias & Mehmet Ugur, 2004. "Can the EU Anchor Policy Reform in Third Countries?," European Union Politics, , vol. 5(4), pages 395-418, December.
    • Handle: RePEc:sae:eeupol:v:5:y:2004:i:4:p:395-418
    DOI: 10.1177/1465116504047310
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    References listed on IDEAS

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    1. Vreeland,James Raymond, 2003. "The IMF and Economic Development," Cambridge Books, Cambridge University Press, number 9780521016957, September.
    2. Kydland, Finn E & Prescott, Edward C, 1977. "Rules Rather Than Discretion: The Inconsistency of Optimal Plans," Journal of Political Economy, University of Chicago Press, vol. 85(3), pages 473-491, June.
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    Cited by:

    1. Lawrence, Robert Z., 2006. "Recent US Free Trade Initiatives in the Middle East: Opportunities but No Guarantees," Working Paper Series rwp06-050, Harvard University, John F. Kennedy School of Government.
    2. Brach, Juliane, 2006. "Ten Years after: Achievements and Challenges of the Euro-Mediterranean Economic and Financial Partnership," GIGA Working Papers 36, GIGA German Institute of Global and Area Studies.
    3. Nellie Munin, 2021. "Israel's Trade Alliances Strategy: Enjoying the Best of All Worlds," International Journal of Law and Public Administration, Redfame publishing, vol. 4(2), pages 23-37, December.
    4. Frank Schimmelfennig & Hanno Scholtz, 2008. "EU Democracy Promotion in the European Neighbourhood," European Union Politics, , vol. 9(2), pages 187-215, June.
    5. Thilo Bodenstein & Mark Furness, 2009. "Separating the Willing from the Able," European Union Politics, , vol. 10(3), pages 381-401, September.

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