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The Stalemate in the Constitutional IGC over the Definition of a Qualified Majority

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  • David R. Cameron

    (Yale University, USA, david.r.cameron@yale.edu)

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  • David R. Cameron, 2004. "The Stalemate in the Constitutional IGC over the Definition of a Qualified Majority," European Union Politics, , vol. 5(3), pages 373-391, September.
  • Handle: RePEc:sae:eeupol:v:5:y:2004:i:3:p:373-391
    DOI: 10.1177/1465116504045158
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    References listed on IDEAS

    as
    1. Max Albert, 2004. "The Voting Power Approach," European Union Politics, , vol. 5(1), pages 139-146, March.
    2. Dan S. Felsenthal & Dennis Leech & Christian List & Moshé Machover, 2003. "In Defence of Voting Power Analysis," European Union Politics, , vol. 4(4), pages 473-497, December.
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