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Proposal complexity and report allocation in the European Parliament

Author

Listed:
  • Steffen Hurka

    (Geschwister-Scholl-Institute of Political Science, 9183Ludwig-Maximilians-University Munich, Munich, Germany)

  • Maximilian Haag

    (Geschwister-Scholl-Institute of Political Science, Ludwig-Maximilians-University Munich, Munich, Germany)

  • Constantin Kaplaner

    (Geschwister-Scholl-Institute of Political Science, Ludwig-Maximilians-University Munich, Munich, Germany)

Abstract

Experience and loyalty have been identified as major explanations for why Members of the European Parliament (MEPs) are selected as committee rapporteurs in the European Parliament. Yet, existing research implicitly assumes that these explanations operate in isolation of what the report is about. In this article, we hypothesize that the effects of experience and loyalty on MEPs’ chances to become rapporteurs should be conditioned by the complexity of the Commission's legislative proposal. We show that party group coordinators indeed distribute the most complex legislative tasks to highly experienced MEPs but cannot confirm such a conditional relationship for the effect of loyalty. Our study contributes to the literature on the legislative organization in the European Parliament by highlighting the role of proposal complexity for the report allocation process.

Suggested Citation

  • Steffen Hurka & Maximilian Haag & Constantin Kaplaner, 2023. "Proposal complexity and report allocation in the European Parliament," European Union Politics, , vol. 24(2), pages 307-326, June.
    • Handle: RePEc:sae:eeupol:v:24:y:2023:i:2:p:307-326
    DOI: 10.1177/14651165221144888
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    References listed on IDEAS

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