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One agenda-setter or many? The varying success of policy initiatives by individual Directorates-General of the European Commission 1994–2016

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  • Rauh, Christian

Abstract

Analyses of strategic agenda-setting in the European Union treat the European Commission as a unitary actor with perfect information. Yet, the constraints for correctly anticipating acceptable policies vary heavily across its individual Directorates-General. Do these internal rifts affect the Commission’s agenda-setting ability? This article tests corresponding expectations on the edit distances between 2237 Commission proposals and the adopted laws across 23 years. The quality of legislative anticipation indeed varies with the responsible Directorate-General. Legislative proposals are more likely to remain unchanged if they face less parliamentary involvement, are less complex, were drafted by an experienced Directorate-General, and were coordinated more seamlessly within the Commission. However, the uncovered variation also calls for more systematic research on the distribution of legislative capacities inside the Commission.

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  • Rauh, Christian, 2021. "One agenda-setter or many? The varying success of policy initiatives by individual Directorates-General of the European Commission 1994–2016," EconStor Open Access Articles and Book Chapters, ZBW - Leibniz Information Centre for Economics, vol. 22(1), pages 3-24.
    • Handle: RePEc:zbw:espost:228463
    DOI: 10.1177/1465116520961467
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    4. Jonathan Golub, 2024. "EUPROPS: A new dataset on policymaking in the European Union from 1958 to 2021," European Union Politics, , vol. 25(1), pages 197-217, March.

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