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Domestic Politics and European Treaty Reform

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  • Daniel Finke

    (University of Heidelberg, Germany, daniel.finke@uni-heidelberg.de)

Abstract

This article analyses the extent to which governmental positions on European integration originate from domestic politics. In contrast to previous studies, I apply a longitudinal research design that allows for an empirical analysis of the domestic dynamics that govern position formation. I use advanced statistical measurement techniques to compare national positions across time. Member states’ economic characteristics define a corridor for governmental positions. However, the political dynamics of the domestic arena determine the final position governments adopt at any particular Intergovernmental Conference (IGC). In particular, when formulating the national position, the short-term trend in public opinion limits governmental discretion. This effect is especially strong if the government announced ratification by referendum and in countries with a system of strong parliamentary scrutiny.

Suggested Citation

  • Daniel Finke, 2009. "Domestic Politics and European Treaty Reform," European Union Politics, , vol. 10(4), pages 482-506, December.
    • Handle: RePEc:sae:eeupol:v:10:y:2009:i:4:p:482-506
    DOI: 10.1177/1465116509346385
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    References listed on IDEAS

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