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When `No' Means `Yes, But'

Author

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  • Achim Kemmerling

    (School of Humanities and Social Sciences, Jacobs University Bremen, PO Box 750 561, 28725 Bremen, Germany, a.kemmerling@jacobs-university.de)

Abstract

In situations where an electoral boycott is feasible, both voters and party leaders sometimes exhibit apparently irrational behavior. We argue that in some cases this can be explained by a strategic rationale. To exemplify this claim we use an empirical puzzle: the Polish accession referendum only passed the turnout threshold because of people who voted `no'. This is puzzling, since these people could easily have stayed at home without hurting the collective interest of their group. Conventional wisdom argues that the `no'-campaign fought an uphill battle and made tactical errors. In addition, voters were supposedly not aware of their strategic situation. We argue that some of these people did not oppose enlargement, but the terms of the negotiation process between the EU and Poland. Microeconometric evidence depicts the common characteristics of these moderately Eurosceptic voters. Moreover, a stylized game-theoretic model shows that Eurosceptic party leaders have behaved in an optimal way that produced benefits for these voters. We deduce a mixed equilibrium which fits the politicians' behavior best.

Suggested Citation

  • Achim Kemmerling, 2008. "When `No' Means `Yes, But'," Rationality and Society, , vol. 20(3), pages 283-309, August.
  • Handle: RePEc:sae:ratsoc:v:20:y:2008:i:3:p:283-309
    DOI: 10.1177/1043463108090134
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    References listed on IDEAS

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