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Captured Development

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  • Joshua M. Jansa
  • Virginia Gray

Abstract

Scholars focus on interstate competition and intrastate economic conditions as the primary determinants of state economic development policies, including direct subsidies. New data from the Good Jobs First Subsidy Tracker illustrates large differences in subsidy spending across the states and that established firms are the disproportionate beneficiaries. In light of this new evidence, we argue that the political presence of the business sector within the state is an important determinant of state subsidy spending. A large political presence helps forward industry interests before government and has the potential to capture state governments. We find support for the cultural capture model by demonstrating that a greater number of lobbyists and campaign contributions from businesses leads to more subsidy spending, all else equal. We conclude that subsidies, and which companies receive them, are a product of both politics and economics.

Suggested Citation

  • Joshua M. Jansa & Virginia Gray, 2017. "Captured Development," Economic Development Quarterly, , vol. 31(1), pages 50-64, February.
    • Handle: RePEc:sae:ecdequ:v:31:y:2017:i:1:p:50-64
    DOI: 10.1177/0891242416682300
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    References listed on IDEAS

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