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Ideologically Sophisticated Donors: Which Candidates Do Individual Contributors Finance?

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  • Michael J. Barber
  • Brandice Canes‐Wrone
  • Sharece Thrower

Abstract

Individuals are the single largest source of campaign contributions, yet we know little about their motivations. For instance, the existing literature questions whether individual contributors sophisticatedly differentiate among candidates according to policy positions, particularly among same‐party candidates. We analyze this issue by combining data from a new survey of over 2,800 in‐ and out‐of‐state donors associated with the 2012 Senate elections, FEC data on contributors’ professions, and legislative records. Three major findings emerge. First, policy agreement between a donor's positions and a senator's roll calls significantly influences the likelihood of giving, even for same‐party contributors. Second, there is a significant effect of committee membership corresponding to a donor's occupation; this holds even for donors who claim that other motivations dominate, but it does not appear to be motivated by an expectation of access. Third, conditional upon a donation occurring, its size is determined by factors outside a legislator's control.

Suggested Citation

  • Michael J. Barber & Brandice Canes‐Wrone & Sharece Thrower, 2017. "Ideologically Sophisticated Donors: Which Candidates Do Individual Contributors Finance?," American Journal of Political Science, John Wiley & Sons, vol. 61(2), pages 271-288, April.
    • Handle: RePEc:wly:amposc:v:61:y:2017:i:2:p:271-288
    DOI: 10.1111/ajps.12275
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    Cited by:

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    2. Thorsten Drautzburg & Igor Livshits & Mark L. J. Wright, 2022. "Polarized Contributions but Convergent Agendas," Working Papers 22-29, Federal Reserve Bank of Philadelphia.
    3. Daisuke Hirata & Yuichiro Kamada, 2020. "Extreme donors and policy convergence," Social Choice and Welfare, Springer;The Society for Social Choice and Welfare, vol. 55(1), pages 149-176, June.
    4. Laurent Bouton & Micael Castanheira & Allan Drazen, 2018. "A Theory of Small Campaign Contributions," NBER Working Papers 24413, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
    5. Laurent Bouton & Julia Cagé & Edgard Dewitte & Vincent Pons, 2021. "Small Campaign Donors," Working Papers hal-03878175, HAL.
    6. Keith E. Schnakenberg & Ian R. Turner, 2021. "Helping Friends or Influencing Foes: Electoral and Policy Effects of Campaign Finance Contributions," American Journal of Political Science, John Wiley & Sons, vol. 65(1), pages 88-100, January.
    7. Larcinese, Valentino & Parmigiani, Alberto, 2023. "Income inequality and campaign contributions: evidence from the Reagan tax cut," LSE Research Online Documents on Economics 118456, London School of Economics and Political Science, LSE Library.
    8. Schnakenberg, Keith & Turner, Ian R, 2019. "Helping Friends or Influencing Foes: Electoral and Policy Effects of Campaign Finance Contributions," SocArXiv nphgu, Center for Open Science.
    9. Rebecca Lessem & Sarah Niebler & Carly Urban, 2023. "Do house prices affect campaign contributions?," Economics and Politics, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 35(2), pages 629-660, July.
    10. Nicolas Gavoille, 2021. "Pay for politicians and campaign spending: evidence from the French municipal elections," Public Choice, Springer, vol. 188(3), pages 455-477, September.

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