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Authoritarian regimes and civil–military relations: Explaining counterbalancing in autocracies

Author

Listed:
  • Abel Escribà -Folch

    (Universitat Pompeu Fabra, Barcelona, Catalunya, Spain)

  • Tobias Böhmelt

    (University of Essex, Colchester, UK)

  • Ulrich Pilster

    (University of Essex, Colchester, UK)

Abstract

How do autocracies structure their civil–military relations? We contend that personalist dictators are more strongly associated with counterbalancing than other authoritarian regime types. Personalists are characterized by weak institutions and narrow support bases, a lack of unifying ideologies and informal links to the ruler. They thus have strong incentives to coup-proof and, as we contend, counterbalancing seems particularly attractive. Quantitative analyses of autocratic regimes’ counterbalancing efforts since the 1960s provide support for this expectation. By showing that institutional coup-proofing significantly varies across autocratic forms of government, we contribute to the literature on comparative authoritarianism and civil–military relations.

Suggested Citation

  • Abel Escribà -Folch & Tobias Böhmelt & Ulrich Pilster, 2020. "Authoritarian regimes and civil–military relations: Explaining counterbalancing in autocracies," Conflict Management and Peace Science, Peace Science Society (International), vol. 37(5), pages 559-579, September.
    • Handle: RePEc:sae:compsc:v:37:y:2020:i:5:p:559-579
    DOI: 10.1177/0738894219836285
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    References listed on IDEAS

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