IDEAS home Printed from https://ideas.repec.org/a/gam/jgames/v14y2023i3p39-d1135324.html
   My bibliography  Save this article

On Some Connections between Negotiating while Fighting and Bargaining between a Buyer and Seller

Author

Listed:
  • Adam Meirowitz

    (Department of Political Science, Yale University, New Haven, CT 06511, USA)

Abstract

We point out an equivalence between a class of games in which players negotiate while fighting and a class of games in which a buyer and seller negotiate over terms. Importantly and perhaps ironically, bargaining before fighting is strategically distinct from bargaining before a change of ownership but bargaining while fighting is equivalent to bargaining before a change of ownership. These connections and intuition from models of bilateral trade help shed light on two mechanisms for learning while frighting: inference based on observing strategic choices and information leakage on the battlefield. Debates on the relative importance of these to mechanism are addressed; some subtle clarifications to extant arguments are provided. Moreover, the importance of learning hard information from the battlefield is connected to work on Coasian Dynamics with information leakage and avenuse for future work relying on advances in behavioral theory are sketched out.

Suggested Citation

  • Adam Meirowitz, 2023. "On Some Connections between Negotiating while Fighting and Bargaining between a Buyer and Seller," Games, MDPI, vol. 14(3), pages 1-9, April.
    • Handle: RePEc:gam:jgames:v:14:y:2023:i:3:p:39-:d:1135324
    as

    Download full text from publisher

    File URL: https://www.mdpi.com/2073-4336/14/3/39/pdf
    Download Restriction: no
    File URL: https://www.mdpi.com/2073-4336/14/3/39/
    Download Restriction: no
    ---><---

    References listed on IDEAS

    as
    1. Robert Powell, 2004. "Bargaining and Learning While Fighting," American Journal of Political Science, John Wiley & Sons, vol. 48(2), pages 344-361, April.
    2. Alessandro Pavan & Ilya Segal & Juuso Toikka, 2014. "Dynamic Mechanism Design: A Myersonian Approach," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 82(2), pages 601-653, March.
    3. Fearon, James D., 1995. "Rationalist explanations for war," International Organization, Cambridge University Press, vol. 49(3), pages 379-414, July.
    4. Slantchev, Branislav L., 2003. "The Principle of Convergence in Wartime Negotiations," American Political Science Review, Cambridge University Press, vol. 97(4), pages 621-632, November.
    5. Drew Fudenberg & David K. Levine & Jean Tirole, 1985. "Infinite-Horizon Models of Bargaining with One-Sided Incomplete Information," Levine's Working Paper Archive 1098, David K. Levine.
    Full references (including those not matched with items on IDEAS)

    Most related items

    These are the items that most often cite the same works as this one and are cited by the same works as this one.
    1. Sambuddha Ghosh & Gabriele Gratton & Caixia Shen, 2019. "Intimidation: Linking Negotiation And Conflict," International Economic Review, Department of Economics, University of Pennsylvania and Osaka University Institute of Social and Economic Research Association, vol. 60(4), pages 1589-1618, November.
    2. Stephen L. Quackenbush, 2016. "Centers of gravity and war outcomes," Conflict Management and Peace Science, Peace Science Society (International), vol. 33(4), pages 361-380, September.
    3. Alastair Smith & Allan C. Stam, 2004. "Bargaining and the Nature of War," Journal of Conflict Resolution, Peace Science Society (International), vol. 48(6), pages 783-813, December.
    4. Constantin Ruhe, 2021. "Impeding fatal violence through third-party diplomacy: The effect of mediation on conflict intensity," Journal of Peace Research, Peace Research Institute Oslo, vol. 58(4), pages 687-701, July.
    5. Nakao Keisuke, 2020. "Rationalist Explanations for Two-Front War," Peace Economics, Peace Science, and Public Policy, De Gruyter, vol. 26(4), pages 1-20, December.
    6. William Spaniel, 2020. "Power transfers, military uncertainty, and war," Journal of Theoretical Politics, , vol. 32(4), pages 538-556, October.
    7. Richard Jordan, 2021. "Symbolic victories and strategic risk," Journal of Peace Research, Peace Research Institute Oslo, vol. 58(5), pages 973-985, September.
    8. Clara Ponsati & Santiago Sanchez-Pages, 2012. "Optimism and commitment: an elementary theory of bargaining and war," SERIEs: Journal of the Spanish Economic Association, Springer;Spanish Economic Association, vol. 3(1), pages 157-179, March.
    9. Clayton Thyne, 2017. "The impact of coups d’état on civil war duration," Conflict Management and Peace Science, Peace Science Society (International), vol. 34(3), pages 287-307, May.
    10. Philip Arena, 2015. "Crisis bargaining, domestic opposition, and tragic wars," Journal of Theoretical Politics, , vol. 27(1), pages 108-131, January.
    11. Eric Min, 2021. "Interstate War Battle dataset (1823–2003)," Journal of Peace Research, Peace Research Institute Oslo, vol. 58(2), pages 294-303, March.
    12. Yuleng Zeng, 2021. "Biding time versus timely retreat: Asymmetric dependence, issue salience, and conflict duration," Journal of Peace Research, Peace Research Institute Oslo, vol. 58(4), pages 719-733, July.
    13. Kim, Jin Yeub, 2018. "Counterthreat of attack to deter aggression," Economics Letters, Elsevier, vol. 167(C), pages 112-114.
    14. Donald Wittman, 2009. "Bargaining in the Shadow of War: When Is a Peaceful Resolution Most Likely?," American Journal of Political Science, John Wiley & Sons, vol. 53(3), pages 588-602, July.
    15. Sanchez-Pages, Santiago, 2009. "Bargaining and Conflict with Incomplete Information," SIRE Discussion Papers 2009-55, Scottish Institute for Research in Economics (SIRE).
    16. Amy Yuen, 2009. "Target Concessions in the Shadow of Intervention," Journal of Conflict Resolution, Peace Science Society (International), vol. 53(5), pages 745-773, October.
    17. Peter Bils & William Spaniel, 2017. "Policy bargaining and militarized conflict," Journal of Theoretical Politics, , vol. 29(4), pages 647-678, October.
    18. Patricia L. Sullivan, 2008. "At What Price Victory? The Effects of Uncertainty on Military Intervention Duration and Outcome," Conflict Management and Peace Science, Peace Science Society (International), vol. 25(1), pages 49-66, February.
    19. Stephen E. Gent & Megan Shannon, 2014. "Bargaining power and the arbitration and adjudication of territorial claims1," Conflict Management and Peace Science, Peace Science Society (International), vol. 31(3), pages 303-322, July.
    20. Nakao, Keisuke, 2013. "How Rebellion Expands? From Periphery to Heartland," MPRA Paper 50546, University Library of Munich, Germany.

    Corrections

    All material on this site has been provided by the respective publishers and authors. You can help correct errors and omissions. When requesting a correction, please mention this item's handle: RePEc:gam:jgames:v:14:y:2023:i:3:p:39-:d:1135324. See general information about how to correct material in RePEc.

    If you have authored this item and are not yet registered with RePEc, we encourage you to do it here. This allows to link your profile to this item. It also allows you to accept potential citations to this item that we are uncertain about.

    If CitEc recognized a bibliographic reference but did not link an item in RePEc to it, you can help with this form .

    If you know of missing items citing this one, you can help us creating those links by adding the relevant references in the same way as above, for each refering item. If you are a registered author of this item, you may also want to check the "citations" tab in your RePEc Author Service profile, as there may be some citations waiting for confirmation.

    For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its authors, title, abstract, bibliographic or download information, contact: MDPI Indexing Manager (email available below). General contact details of provider: https://www.mdpi.com .

    Please note that corrections may take a couple of weeks to filter through the various RePEc services.

    IDEAS is a RePEc service. RePEc uses bibliographic data supplied by the respective publishers.