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At What Price Victory? The Effects of Uncertainty on Military Intervention Duration and Outcome

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  • Patricia L. Sullivan

    (Department of International Affairs School of Public and International Affairs The University of Georgia Athens, Georgia, USA, tsulli@uga.edu)

Abstract

I extend the implications of a rationalist model of war initiation to explore the effects of uncertainty about the cost of prosecuting a war to victory on the duration and outcome of military operations. When the attributes of a potential armed conflict create uncertainty about the human and material costs of attaining a state's war aims, states are at risk of selecting themselves into long, costly, and ultimately unsuccessful military engagements. The more the actual costs of fighting exceed a state's prewar expectations, the greater the likelihood that it will eventually be pushed beyond its cost-tolerance threshold and forced to unilaterally withdraw from the conflict before it attains its war aims. At the same time, states must fight longer before they arrive at accurate estimates of what it will cost to attain their objectives when the attributes of a conflict contribute to high levels of uncertainty.

Suggested Citation

  • Patricia L. Sullivan, 2008. "At What Price Victory? The Effects of Uncertainty on Military Intervention Duration and Outcome," Conflict Management and Peace Science, Peace Science Society (International), vol. 25(1), pages 49-66, February.
    • Handle: RePEc:sae:compsc:v:25:y:2008:i:1:p:49-66
    DOI: 10.1080/07388940701860383
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    References listed on IDEAS

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