Interdependence and Conflict: When Does Symmetry Matter?
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DOI: 10.1177/073889420302000104
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References listed on IDEAS
- Gary Clyde Hufbauer & Jeffrey J. Schott & Kimberly Ann Elliott, 2009. "Economic Sanctions Reconsidered, 3rd Edition (paper)," Peterson Institute Press: All Books, Peterson Institute for International Economics, number 4129, January.
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- Wagner, R. Harrison, 1988. "Economic interdependence, bargaining power, and political influence," International Organization, Cambridge University Press, vol. 42(3), pages 461-483, July.
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