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Club Formation and Response To Natural Disaster: An Example From South Carolina

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  • Ben L. Kyer
  • Gary E. Maggs

Abstract

In 2016, Hurricane Matthew caused approximately 10 billion dollars of damage in the United States and nearly 350 million dollars in South Carolina. The historic rainfall damaged or completely destroyed roads, bridges, buildings, crops, and dams. This paper documents how one small lakefront community in eastern South Carolina formed a de facto Buchanan Club to fund the reconstruction of a dam destroyed by Matthew and restore a small lake, an exemplary club good. This private response was needed because both the Federal and State governments declined public assistance. In the end and roughly approximately two years after Matthew, the dam was repaired and the lake refilled with the rainfall of Hurricane Florence. JEL Classifications : H00, H41, H89

Suggested Citation

  • Ben L. Kyer & Gary E. Maggs, 2022. "Club Formation and Response To Natural Disaster: An Example From South Carolina," The American Economist, Sage Publications, vol. 67(1), pages 99-105, March.
    • Handle: RePEc:sae:amerec:v:67:y:2022:i:1:p:99-105
    DOI: 10.1177/05694345211049536
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    References listed on IDEAS

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    More about this item

    Keywords

    club; club goods; homeowners association; initial assessment fee; dues; free rider;
    All these keywords.

    JEL classification:

    • H00 - Public Economics - - General - - - General
    • H41 - Public Economics - - Publicly Provided Goods - - - Public Goods
    • H89 - Public Economics - - Miscellaneous Issues - - - Other

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