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Quality, Uncertainty and the Internet: The Market for Cyber Lemons

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  • John H. Huston
  • Roger W. Spencer

Abstract

The internet makes it easier for buyers to purchase goods from distant sellers. However, the inability of the buyer to examine the merchandise results in asymmetry of information. This paper develops a theoretical model to analyze the relationship between quality and price in a setting of asymmetrical information. In the spirit of Akerlof (1970), the model predicts that higher quality goods are less likely to be sold in the market. Since buyers have difficulty distinguishing quality, sellers would have to accept lower prices for their highest quality items. The model is tested using data from internet coin auctions. The results show that coins that are claimed to be of higher quality are less likely to sell and when they do sell do so at lower prices relative to their market value.

Suggested Citation

  • John H. Huston & Roger W. Spencer, 2002. "Quality, Uncertainty and the Internet: The Market for Cyber Lemons," The American Economist, Sage Publications, vol. 46(1), pages 50-60, March.
    • Handle: RePEc:sae:amerec:v:46:y:2002:i:1:p:50-60
    DOI: 10.1177/056943450204600107
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    References listed on IDEAS

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    1. Russell Cooper & Thomas W. Ross, 1984. "Prices, Product Qualities and Asymmetric Information: The Competitive Case," The Review of Economic Studies, Review of Economic Studies Ltd, vol. 51(2), pages 197-207.
    2. David Lucking-Reiley, 1999. "Using Field Experiments to Test Equivalence between Auction Formats: Magic on the Internet," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 89(5), pages 1063-1080, December.
    3. Kim, Jae-Cheol, 1985. "The Market for "Lemons" Reconsidered: A Model of the Used Car Market with Asymmetric Information," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 75(4), pages 836-843, September.
    4. George A. Akerlof, 1970. "The Market for "Lemons": Quality Uncertainty and the Market Mechanism," The Quarterly Journal of Economics, President and Fellows of Harvard College, vol. 84(3), pages 488-500.
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    Cited by:

    1. Chang, Eunmi & Chin, Hyun, 2018. "Signaling or experiencing: Commitment HRM effects on recruitment and employees' online ratings," Journal of Business Research, Elsevier, vol. 84(C), pages 175-185.
    2. Judy E. Scott & Dawn G. Gregg & Jae Hoon Choi, 2015. "Lemon complaints: When online auctions go sour," Information Systems Frontiers, Springer, vol. 17(1), pages 177-191, February.

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