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Harmonization of the relations between the state and individuals in the context of taxation theory

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  • Yuliya Tyurina

    (Department of Finances, Orenburg State University, Russia)

Abstract

The state policy, directed on provision of stable economic growth, increase of its quality, assumes search for and use of sources and instruments of intensification and diversification of economy. Budget fiscal policy relates to one of such instruments, which allow to provide for balance between justice of taxation and efficiency of economic development of the state. The problems of taxation and impact of taxes on the dynamics of social-economic development are among the most important in the market economy. The development of the fiscal system of a country causes constant contradictions between taxpayers and state authority in the issues of taxation. The article considers conceptual issues of searching for balance of interests of the state and individuals within the sphere of taxation. The theoretical basis of taxation of individuals in parallel with the stages of development of taxation theory and genesis of the interests of the state and individuals are reflected. Principles of taxation as fundamental rules of harmonization of relations of the state and taxpayers are systematized.

Suggested Citation

  • Yuliya Tyurina, 2014. "Harmonization of the relations between the state and individuals in the context of taxation theory," Review of Applied Socio-Economic Research, Pro Global Science Association, vol. 8(2), pages 207-218, June.
    • Handle: RePEc:rse:wpaper:v:8:y:2014:i:2:p:207-218
    as

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    References listed on IDEAS

    as
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    More about this item

    Keywords

    taxation theories; fiscal relations; harmonization; state; individual; tax; principles of taxation;
    All these keywords.

    JEL classification:

    • E62 - Macroeconomics and Monetary Economics - - Macroeconomic Policy, Macroeconomic Aspects of Public Finance, and General Outlook - - - Fiscal Policy; Modern Monetary Theory
    • H2 - Public Economics - - Taxation, Subsidies, and Revenue

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