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Optimal Nonlinear Income Taxation with a Finite Population

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  • Jonathan Hamilton
  • Steven Slutsky

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  • Jonathan Hamilton & Steven Slutsky, 2003. "Optimal Nonlinear Income Taxation with a Finite Population," Levine's Working Paper Archive 234936000000000079, David K. Levine.
    • Handle: RePEc:cla:levarc:234936000000000079
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    1. Groves, Theodore & Ledyard, John O, 1977. "Optimal Allocation of Public Goods: A Solution to the "Free Rider" Problem," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 45(4), pages 783-809, May.
    2. Joseph E. Stiglitz, 1977. "Monopoly, Non-linear Pricing and Imperfect Information: The Insurance Market," The Review of Economic Studies, Review of Economic Studies Ltd, vol. 44(3), pages 407-430.
    3. Kevin Roberts, 1984. "The Theoretical Limits to Redistribution," The Review of Economic Studies, Review of Economic Studies Ltd, vol. 51(2), pages 177-195.
    4. J. A. Mirrlees, 1971. "An Exploration in the Theory of Optimum Income Taxation," The Review of Economic Studies, Review of Economic Studies Ltd, vol. 38(2), pages 175-208.
    5. Farrell, Joseph & Maskin, Eric, 1989. "Renegotiation in repeated games," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 1(4), pages 327-360, December.
    6. Eric Maskin & John Riley, 1984. "Monopoly with Incomplete Information," RAND Journal of Economics, The RAND Corporation, vol. 15(2), pages 171-196, Summer.
    7. Fudenberg, Drew & Tirole, Jean, 1990. "Moral Hazard and Renegotiation in Agency Contracts," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 58(6), pages 1279-1319, November.
    8. Peter J. Hammond, 1979. "Straightforward Individual Incentive Compatibility in Large Economies," The Review of Economic Studies, Review of Economic Studies Ltd, vol. 46(2), pages 263-282.
    9. David P. Baron & David Besanko, 1987. "Commitment and Fairness in a Dynamic Regulatory Relationship," The Review of Economic Studies, Review of Economic Studies Ltd, vol. 54(3), pages 413-436.
    10. Panzar, John C & Willig, Robert D, 1976. "Vindication of a "Common Mistake" in Welfare Economics," Journal of Political Economy, University of Chicago Press, vol. 84(6), pages 1361-1363, December.
    11. Piketty Thomas, 1993. "Implementation of First-Best Allocations via Generalized Tax Schedules," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 61(1), pages 23-41, October.
    12. Dorfman, Robert, 1975. "Note on a Common Mistake in Welfare Economics," Journal of Political Economy, University of Chicago Press, vol. 83(4), pages 863-864, August.
    13. Edward Clarke, 1971. "Multipart pricing of public goods," Public Choice, Springer, vol. 11(1), pages 17-33, September.
    14. Groves, Theodore, 1973. "Incentives in Teams," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 41(4), pages 617-631, July.
    15. Stiglitz, Joseph E., 1982. "Self-selection and Pareto efficient taxation," Journal of Public Economics, Elsevier, vol. 17(2), pages 213-240, March.
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    Cited by:

    1. Felix J., Bierbrauer, 2011. "On the optimality of optimal income taxation," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 146(5), pages 2105-2116, September.
    2. Craig Brett & John A. Weymark, 2019. "Optimal nonlinear taxation of income and savings without commitment," Journal of Public Economic Theory, Association for Public Economic Theory, vol. 21(1), pages 5-43, February.
    3. Shigeo Morita & Takuya Obara, 2018. "Optimal capital income taxation in the case of private donations to public goods," Economics Bulletin, AccessEcon, vol. 38(2), pages 921-939.
    4. Craig Brett & John A. Weymark, 2005. "Optimal Nonlinear Taxation of Income and Savings in a Two Class Economy," Vanderbilt University Department of Economics Working Papers 0525, Vanderbilt University Department of Economics.
    5. Hamilton, Jonathan & Slutsky, Steven, 2017. "Judicial review and the power of the executive and legislative branches," Research in Economics, Elsevier, vol. 71(1), pages 67-85.
    6. Shigeo Morita & Takuya Obara, 2016. "Optimal Capital Income Taxation in the Case of Private Donations to Public Goods," Discussion Papers in Economics and Business 16-21, Osaka University, Graduate School of Economics.
    7. Yuliya Tyurina, 2014. "Harmonization of the relations between the state and individuals in the context of taxation theory," Review of Applied Socio-Economic Research, Pro Global Science Association, vol. 8(2), pages 207-218, June.
    8. Simon Fan & Yu Pang & Pierre Pestieau, 2020. "A model of the optimal allocation of government expenditures," Journal of Public Economic Theory, Association for Public Economic Theory, vol. 22(4), pages 845-876, August.
    9. Felix Bierbrauer, 2010. "On the Optimality of Optimal Income Taxation," CESifo Working Paper Series 3163, CESifo.

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