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Corporate Governance Mechanism Practiced By Romanian Entities

Author

Listed:
  • Alina Madalina BELU
  • Cătălina SITNIKOV
  • Anca BANDOI

Abstract

Corporate governance defines all the principles, rules and norms that ensure the administration and management by managers of entities, in the interest of current and potential investors; this interest is classic and the most common. In its context, managers are studied in relation to shareholders. Being a political report, in which there are other stakeholders, the governance acquires an extended interest. A distinct place is occupied in the case of managers and shareholders, creditors and employees, with their claims. Corporate governance has an important role to play in protecting shareholders 'interests as it supports maximizing the value of long-term ownership of the company, and in stimulating investors' attention to the company by making the company's activities and processes transparent and efficient as investors need accurate and quality information. The purpose of the research: to determine the way in which the managers of several entities in Romania perceive the main elements of corporate governance. Method: we resorted to the approach of a statistical-mathematical analysis of quantitative type, for data collection using the questionnaire as a research tool. Findings: pursuing the purpose of analyzing corporate governance, some ideas can be advanced and developed, such as the fact that corporate governance does not only involve supervision and stimulation in order to achieve performance, it must encourage experiments and the dissemination of advanced practices, make a decisive contribution not only in defending the interests of investors but also in ensuring social stability, encouraging mobility and qualitative growth of human capital, orderly development of production processes, close correlation with cultural values.

Suggested Citation

  • Alina Madalina BELU & Cătălina SITNIKOV & Anca BANDOI, 2021. "Corporate Governance Mechanism Practiced By Romanian Entities," Proceedings of the INTERNATIONAL MANAGEMENT CONFERENCE, Faculty of Management, Academy of Economic Studies, Bucharest, Romania, vol. 15(1), pages 712-721, November.
  • Handle: RePEc:rom:mancon:v:15:y:2021:i:1:p:712-721
    DOI: 10.24818/IMC/2021/04.07
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    References listed on IDEAS

    as
    1. Martynova, Marina & Renneboog, Luc, 2011. "Evidence on the international evolution and convergence of corporate governance regulations," Journal of Corporate Finance, Elsevier, vol. 17(5), pages 1531-1557.
    2. Barker, Roger M., 2010. "Corporate Governance, Competition, and Political Parties: Explaining Corporate Governance Change in Europe," OUP Catalogue, Oxford University Press, number 9780199576814.
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