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Was there a collusion? (Once again on the monopolistically high prices of Russian oil companies)
[Был Ли Молчаливый Сговор? Еще Раз О Монопольно Высоких Ценах Российских Нефтяных Компаний]

Author

Listed:
  • Yusupova, Guzel (Юсупова, Гюзель)

    (NRU HSE)

  • Kiseleva, Olga (Киселева, Ольга)

    (New school of economics)

Abstract

Legal structure "abuse of collective dominance" corresponds to the behavior of companies, well-known economist as a "tacit collusion": the interdependence of the sellers makes it profitable for them to maintain high prices even in the absence of an explicit agreement between them. For the Russian market, which are attended by the major oil companies, characterized by factors that really facilitate tacit collusion. However, the analysis showed that even in times of an alleged violation of antitrust laws (purpose monopolistically high prices as the abuse of dominant position), the actual prices of sellers may not correspond to the model of tacit collusion.

Suggested Citation

  • Yusupova, Guzel (Юсупова, Гюзель) & Kiseleva, Olga (Киселева, Ольга), 2015. "Was there a collusion? (Once again on the monopolistically high prices of Russian oil companies) [Был Ли Молчаливый Сговор? Еще Раз О Монопольно Высоких Ценах Российских Нефтяных Компаний]," Ekonomicheskaya Politika / Economic Policy, Russian Presidential Academy of National Economy and Public Administration, vol. 4, pages 178-195.
  • Handle: RePEc:rnp:ecopol:ep1549
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    References listed on IDEAS

    as
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    More about this item

    Keywords

    abuse of collective dominance; market power; collusion; the Russian market of petroleum products;
    All these keywords.

    JEL classification:

    • K21 - Law and Economics - - Regulation and Business Law - - - Antitrust Law
    • L13 - Industrial Organization - - Market Structure, Firm Strategy, and Market Performance - - - Oligopoly and Other Imperfect Markets
    • L41 - Industrial Organization - - Antitrust Issues and Policies - - - Monopolization; Horizontal Anticompetitive Practices

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