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Price and non-price restraints when retailers are vertically differentiated

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  • Spiegel, Yossi
  • Yehezkel, Yaron

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  • Spiegel, Yossi & Yehezkel, Yaron, 2003. "Price and non-price restraints when retailers are vertically differentiated," International Journal of Industrial Organization, Elsevier, vol. 21(7), pages 923-947, September.
    • Handle: RePEc:eee:indorg:v:21:y:2003:i:7:p:923-947
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    1. Jaskold Gabszewicz, J. & Thisse, J. -F., 1979. "Price competition, quality and income disparities," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 20(3), pages 340-359, June.
    2. Comanor, William S & Frech, H E, III, 1985. "The Competitive Effects of Vertical Agreements?," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 75(3), pages 539-546, June.
    3. William Comanor & Patrick Rey, 1997. "Competition Policy towards Vertical Restraints in Europe and the United States," Empirica, Springer;Austrian Institute for Economic Research;Austrian Economic Association, vol. 24(1), pages 37-52, January.
    4. Drew Fudenberg & Jean Tirole, 1998. "Upgrades, Tradeins, and Buybacks," RAND Journal of Economics, The RAND Corporation, vol. 29(2), pages 235-258, Summer.
    5. Ralph A. Winter, 1993. "Vertical Control and Price Versus Nonprice Competition," The Quarterly Journal of Economics, President and Fellows of Harvard College, vol. 108(1), pages 61-76.
    6. Howard P. Marvel & Stephen McCafferty, 1984. "Resale Price Maintenance and Quality Certification," RAND Journal of Economics, The RAND Corporation, vol. 15(3), pages 346-359, Autumn.
    7. Katz, Michael L., 1989. "Vertical contractual relations," Handbook of Industrial Organization, in: R. Schmalensee & R. Willig (ed.), Handbook of Industrial Organization, edition 1, volume 1, chapter 11, pages 655-721, Elsevier.
    8. Frank Mathewson & Ralph Winter, 1998. "The Law and Economics of Resale Price Maintenance," Review of Industrial Organization, Springer;The Industrial Organization Society, vol. 13(1), pages 57-84, April.
    9. Raymond J. Deneckere & R. Preston McAfee, 1996. "Damaged Goods," Journal of Economics & Management Strategy, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 5(2), pages 149-174, June.
    10. Jaskold Gabszewicz, Jean & Shaked, Avner & Sutton, John & Thisse, Jacques-Francois, 1986. "Segmenting the market: The monopolist's optimal product mix," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 39(2), pages 273-289, August.
    11. Rey, Patrick & Tirole, Jean, 1986. "The Logic of Vertical Restraints," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 76(5), pages 921-939, December.
    12. Patrick Bolton & Giacomo Bonanno, 1988. "Vertical Restraints in a Model of Vertical Differentiation," The Quarterly Journal of Economics, President and Fellows of Harvard College, vol. 103(3), pages 555-570.
    13. Mussa, Michael & Rosen, Sherwin, 1978. "Monopoly and product quality," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 18(2), pages 301-317, August.
    14. R. Schmalensee & R. Willig (ed.), 1989. "Handbook of Industrial Organization," Handbook of Industrial Organization, Elsevier, edition 1, volume 2, number 2.
    15. Michael Utton, 1996. "Selective Distribution, Refusal to Sell and the Monopolies and Mergers Commission," International Journal of the Economics of Business, Taylor & Francis Journals, vol. 3(1), pages 43-55.
    16. R. Schmalensee & R. Willig (ed.), 1989. "Handbook of Industrial Organization," Handbook of Industrial Organization, Elsevier, edition 1, volume 1, number 1.
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    Cited by:

    1. Ricardo GONCALVES & Álvaro NASCIMENTO, 2013. "Next Generation Access Networks: The Post-Investment Conundrum," Communications & Strategies, IDATE, Com&Strat dept., vol. 1(92), pages 91-112, 4th quart.
    2. Martin Obradovits, 2013. "Excessive supplier pricing and high-quality foreclosure," Vienna Economics Papers vie1303, University of Vienna, Department of Economics.
    3. Moner-Colonques, Rafael, 2006. "The tradeoffs between retail service and exclusivity in distribution: Welfare and policy implications," International Review of Law and Economics, Elsevier, vol. 26(2), pages 241-261, June.
    4. Eichberger, Jürgen & Mueller-Langer, Frank, 2012. "On the Welfare Effects of Exclusive Distribution Arrangements," MPRA Paper 39691, University Library of Munich, Germany.
    5. Markus Reisinger & Emanuele Tarantino, 2015. "Vertical integration, foreclosure, and productive efficiency," RAND Journal of Economics, RAND Corporation, vol. 46(3), pages 461-479, September.
    6. Thomes, Tim Paul, 2013. "An economic analysis of online streaming music services," Information Economics and Policy, Elsevier, vol. 25(2), pages 81-91.
    7. Li, Shengyu & Luo, Rong, 2020. "Non-Exclusive Dealing with Retailer Differentiation and Market Penetration," International Journal of Industrial Organization, Elsevier, vol. 70(C).

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