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"Coalition clinch" against the Islamic order: the dynamics of market institutions dispute resolution in Dagestan
[«Коалиционный Клинч» Против Исламского Порядка: Динамика Рынка Институтов Разрешения Споров В Дагестане]

Author

Listed:
  • Varshaver, Evgeniy (Варшавер, Евгений)

    (Russian Presidential Academy of National Economy and Public Administration (RANEPA))

  • Kruglova, Ekaterina (Круглова, Екатерина)

    (Lomonosov Moscow State University)

Abstract

In the article on the example of Dagestan shows how two social order, "the coalition clinch" and the Islamic order, coexisting in the same area, competing with each other. This is demonstrated by the institutions of dispute resolution. Institute of Islamic order, associated with lower transaction costs and a lower level of uncertainty, gradually spread in society, undermining the dominance of inefficient institutions "clinch a coalition." Constraints on diffusion of the new rules are the rules of start-up costs of development, and is currently the practice of the Islamic order are marginal.

Suggested Citation

  • Varshaver, Evgeniy (Варшавер, Евгений) & Kruglova, Ekaterina (Круглова, Екатерина), 2015. ""Coalition clinch" against the Islamic order: the dynamics of market institutions dispute resolution in Dagestan [«Коалиционный Клинч» Против Исламского Порядка: Динамика Рынка Институтов," Ekonomicheskaya Politika / Economic Policy, Russian Presidential Academy of National Economy and Public Administration, vol. 3, pages 89-112.
    • Handle: RePEc:rnp:ecopol:1539
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    File URL: https://repec.ranepa.ru/rnp/ecopol/1539.pdf
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    References listed on IDEAS

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    1. repec:bla:kyklos:v:47:y:1994:i:4:p:519-29 is not listed on IDEAS
    2. Dickson, Alex & Hartley, Roger, 2008. "The strategic Marshallian cross," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 64(2), pages 514-532, November.
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    Cited by:

    1. Kazenin, Konstantin Igorevich (Казенин, Константин Игоревич), 2016. "Institutional Competition Regulators in the Urban Environment of the North Caucasus [Конкуренция Институциональных Регуляторов В Городской Среде Северного Кавказа]," Working Papers 456, Russian Presidential Academy of National Economy and Public Administration.

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    More about this item

    Keywords

    polijuridism; social order; market institutions Sharia;
    All these keywords.

    JEL classification:

    • D02 - Microeconomics - - General - - - Institutions: Design, Formation, Operations, and Impact
    • K40 - Law and Economics - - Legal Procedure, the Legal System, and Illegal Behavior - - - General
    • K41 - Law and Economics - - Legal Procedure, the Legal System, and Illegal Behavior - - - Litigation Process
    • O17 - Economic Development, Innovation, Technological Change, and Growth - - Economic Development - - - Formal and Informal Sectors; Shadow Economy; Institutional Arrangements

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