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The elites’ demand for law: “Overcrowded streetcar (tram) effect”

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  • Grigoryev, Leonid

Abstract

The demand for law on the part of the society (business, middle class, civil society) is not sufficient at the transformation stage — the reciprocal demand for law from the power elite is necessary. Contemporary theory states that in the contrary case the pressure on elites would require a more open regime of participation. In order to strengthen the positions of the power elite in the long-run it is necessary to limit endless redistribution of assets and introduce the common rule for all.

Suggested Citation

  • Grigoryev, Leonid, 2015. "The elites’ demand for law: “Overcrowded streetcar (tram) effect”," Russian Journal of Economics, Elsevier, vol. 1(3), pages 313-327.
    • Handle: RePEc:eee:rujoec:v:1:y:2015:i:3:p:313-327
    DOI: 10.1016/j.ruje.2015.12.003
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    More about this item

    Keywords

    elite; demand for law; rule of law;
    All these keywords.

    JEL classification:

    • P26 - Political Economy and Comparative Economic Systems - - Socialist and Transition Economies - - - Property Rights
    • P48 - Political Economy and Comparative Economic Systems - - Other Economic Systems - - - Legal Institutions; Property Rights; Natural Resources; Energy; Environment; Regional Studies

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