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Dissemination of Institutional Changes: Internal Planning, Import and Spontaneous Formation

Author

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  • Volodymyr Semtsov

    (Vinnitsa Institute of Economics of Ternopil National Economic University, Vinnitsa, Ukraine)

Abstract

During the fulfillment of its tasks and functions, government bodies systematically face problems that cannot be solved, avoiding the determination of the category of 'institutes'. Obviously, that the identification of 'necessary' institutions is the key to using new reserves to ensure sustainable socio-economic development of the national economy. Institutes, in fact, give to government bodies the specific tools for using a distinctive approach to regulating the activities of economic entities in one or another territory. The purpose of the article is the formation of new solutions and approaches to the treatment of the mechanisms of 'birth' of institutions, as well as the solution of the task of modernizing the domestic institutional environment. Author analyzes and systematizes the main mechanisms for the implementation of institutional changes, and on this basis, forms their own vision for solving problem by substantiating the approaches and principles of the dissemination of more effective institutes. In particular, the existing scientific views and approaches to the problem of the introduction and dissemination of institutes were studied and systematized. The basal dysfunctions of market regulation in the context of socio-economic institutes were identified. It was established that the greatest danger of reforms in the conditions of post-industrial development is the emergence of 'institutional traps', that is, the actions of stable ineffective institutes. The institutes according to the criterion of effectiveness were divided. The determinants of identification of optimal institutional changes were revealed. Author showed examples of the disadvantages of importing institutes. It was proved that effective planning of institutes can significantly alleviate the resistance of market agents who have dysfunctional behavior, whereas their import and / or spontaneous formation can only act as a reference point for institutional change.

Suggested Citation

  • Volodymyr Semtsov, 2018. "Dissemination of Institutional Changes: Internal Planning, Import and Spontaneous Formation," Oblik i finansi, Institute of Accounting and Finance, issue 2, pages 130-140, June.
    • Handle: RePEc:iaf:journl:y:2018:i:2:p:130-140
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    References listed on IDEAS

    as
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    2. Howitt, Peter & Wintrobe, Ronald, 1995. "The political economy of inaction," Journal of Public Economics, Elsevier, vol. 56(3), pages 329-353, March.
    3. Polterovich, Victor, 2007. "Institutional Trap," MPRA Paper 20595, University Library of Munich, Germany.
    4. Eaton, Jonathan, 1989. "Foreign public capital flows," Handbook of Development Economics, in: Hollis Chenery & T.N. Srinivasan (ed.), Handbook of Development Economics, edition 1, volume 2, chapter 25, pages 1305-1386, Elsevier.
    5. repec:bla:kyklos:v:47:y:1994:i:4:p:519-29 is not listed on IDEAS
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    More about this item

    Keywords

    institutes; institutional economics; value added tax; state regulation; economic behavior;
    All these keywords.

    JEL classification:

    • P59 - Political Economy and Comparative Economic Systems - - Comparative Economic Systems - - - Other
    • H39 - Public Economics - - Fiscal Policies and Behavior of Economic Agents - - - Other

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