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Asymptotic Relations in Cournot’s Quantity Game: Some International Trade Implications - Relazioni asintotiche nel gioco di Cournot: alcune implicazioni per il commercio internazionale

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In this paper, drawing on international trade theory, I derive the asymptotic relation that holds for oligopolists’ iso-profit curves within Cournot’s game and I discuss the properties of the Nash equilibrium. Thereafter, I provide an economic rationale for such a mathematical relation. The results of this exploration suggest that for each firm the asymptotes of the iso-profit curves convey the boundaries towards which output competitors become net purchasers of the produced good. - In questo lavoro, con riferimento alla teoria del commercio internazionale, deriviamo la relazione asintotica verificata dalle curve di iso-profitto di due ipotetiche imprese che in un mercato oligopolistico competono nelle quantità. In aggiunta, dopo aver discusso le proprietà del risultante equilibrio di Nash, forniamo una spiegazione economica di questa relazione matematica. I risultati di questa indagine teorica suggeriscono che per ogni impresa gli asintoti delle curve di iso-profitto rappresentano i limiti produttivi verso i quali i rispettivi contendenti sul mercato del prodotto diventano acquirenti netti nella merce presa in considerazione.

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  • Guerrazzi, Marco, 2013. "Asymptotic Relations in Cournot’s Quantity Game: Some International Trade Implications - Relazioni asintotiche nel gioco di Cournot: alcune implicazioni per il commercio internazionale," Economia Internazionale / International Economics, Camera di Commercio Industria Artigianato Agricoltura di Genova, vol. 66(1), pages 47-56.
    • Handle: RePEc:ris:ecoint:0675
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    References listed on IDEAS

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    1. Collie, David, 1992. "International Trade and Cournot Equilibrium: Existence, Uniqueness and Comparative Statics," Bulletin of Economic Research, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 44(1), pages 55-66, January.
    2. James R. MARKUSEN, 2021. "Trade And The Gains From Trade With Imperfect Competition," World Scientific Book Chapters, in: BROADENING TRADE THEORY Incorporating Market Realities into Traditional Models, chapter 14, pages 303-323, World Scientific Publishing Co. Pte. Ltd..
    3. Mas-Colell, Andreu & Whinston, Michael D. & Green, Jerry R., 1995. "Microeconomic Theory," OUP Catalogue, Oxford University Press, number 9780195102680.
    4. R. Melvin, James & Warne, Robert D., 1973. "Monopoly and the theory of international trade," Journal of International Economics, Elsevier, vol. 3(2), pages 117-134, May.
    5. Marco Guerrazzi, 2014. "Involuntary Unemployment and Efficiency-Wage Competition," Research in Labor Economics, in: New Analyses of Worker Well-Being, volume 38, pages 193-210, Emerald Group Publishing Limited.
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    More about this item

    Keywords

    Cournot’s Game; International Trade; Nash Equilibrium; Asymptotes;
    All these keywords.

    JEL classification:

    • C72 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Game Theory and Bargaining Theory - - - Noncooperative Games
    • F12 - International Economics - - Trade - - - Models of Trade with Imperfect Competition and Scale Economies; Fragmentation

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