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Patriarchal Monopoly and Economic Development

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  • Dipankar Purkayastha

Abstract

On the basis of a simple stylized neoclassical model, this paper attempts to define the concept of intra-household rent-seeking behavior. The intra-household rent is determined within the intra-household market for "patriarchal goods." The paper shows that inefficient rent-seeking behavior can explain marginalization of women as economic growth increases men's real income. The model may be used to understand why women's household work may have a lower perceived value in some households.

Suggested Citation

  • Dipankar Purkayastha, 1999. "Patriarchal Monopoly and Economic Development," Feminist Economics, Taylor & Francis Journals, vol. 5(2), pages 61-78.
    • Handle: RePEc:taf:femeco:v:5:y:1999:i:2:p:61-78
    DOI: 10.1080/135457099337941
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