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Empirical analysis of municipal peculiarities influence on price outcomes of public purchases

Author

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  • Eremina, Anastasia

    (National Research University Higher School of Economics, Nizhny Novgorod, Russian Federation)

  • Zoroastrova, Irina

    (National Research University Higher School of Economics, Nizhny Novgorod, Russian Federation)

  • Maksimov, Andrey

    (National Research University Higher School of Economics, Nizhny Novgorod, Russian Federation)

Abstract

Municipal contracts present an essential share of overall sum of purchases in the contract system of Russian Federation. The research agenda of authors focuses on the analysis of price outcomes of municipal purchases in some districts of Moscow region in the period of 2007–2011, aimed at revealing the factors influencing contract price by means of econometrics. As a result, differences in contract price formation, depending on district of Moscow region, are revealed

Suggested Citation

  • Eremina, Anastasia & Zoroastrova, Irina & Maksimov, Andrey, 2018. "Empirical analysis of municipal peculiarities influence on price outcomes of public purchases," Applied Econometrics, Russian Presidential Academy of National Economy and Public Administration (RANEPA), vol. 51, pages 84-101.
    • Handle: RePEc:ris:apltrx:0350
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    References listed on IDEAS

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    1. Andrei Yakovlev & Oleg Vyglovsky & Olga Demidova & Alexander Bashlyk, 2016. "Incentives for repeated contracts in public sector: empirical study of gasoline procurement in Russia," International Journal of Procurement Management, Inderscience Enterprises Ltd, vol. 9(3), pages 272-289.
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    3. Hiroshi Ohashi, 2009. "Effects of Transparency in Procurement Practices on Government Expenditure: A Case Study of Municipal Public Works," Review of Industrial Organization, Springer;The Industrial Organization Society, vol. 34(3), pages 267-285, May.
    4. Callea, Giuditta & Armeni, Patrizio & Marsilio, Marta & Jommi, Claudio & Tarricone, Rosanna, 2017. "The impact of HTA and procurement practices on the selection and prices of medical devices," Social Science & Medicine, Elsevier, vol. 174(C), pages 89-95.
    5. Lalive, Rafael & Schmutzler, Armin, 2011. "Auctions vs Negotiations in Public Procurement: Which Works Better?," CEPR Discussion Papers 8538, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers.
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    More about this item

    Keywords

    public procurement; public purchases; oil-product market; frequency of interaction.;
    All these keywords.

    JEL classification:

    • C21 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Single Equation Models; Single Variables - - - Cross-Sectional Models; Spatial Models; Treatment Effect Models
    • C51 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Econometric Modeling - - - Model Construction and Estimation
    • H57 - Public Economics - - National Government Expenditures and Related Policies - - - Procurement
    • L13 - Industrial Organization - - Market Structure, Firm Strategy, and Market Performance - - - Oligopoly and Other Imperfect Markets

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