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Public Procurement Auctions and Competition in Turkey

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  • Bedri Kamil Onur Tas
  • Rasim Ozcan
  • Ilke Onur

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  • Bedri Kamil Onur Tas & Rasim Ozcan & Ilke Onur, 2008. "Public Procurement Auctions and Competition in Turkey," Working Papers 0814, TOBB University of Economics and Technology, Department of Economics.
    • Handle: RePEc:tob:wpaper:0814
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    1. De Silva, Dakshina G. & Jeitschko, Thomas D. & Kosmopoulou, Georgia, 2005. "Stochastic synergies in sequential auctions," International Journal of Industrial Organization, Elsevier, vol. 23(3-4), pages 183-201, April.
    2. Estache, Antonio & Iimi, Atsushi, 2008. "Procurement efficiency for infrastructure development and financial needs reassessed," Policy Research Working Paper Series 4662, The World Bank.
    3. Paarsch, Harry J., 1992. "Deciding between the common and private value paradigms in empirical models of auctions," Journal of Econometrics, Elsevier, vol. 51(1-2), pages 191-215.
    4. Brannman, Lance & Klein, J Douglass & Weiss, Leonard W, 1987. "The Price Effects of Increased Competition in Auction Markets," The Review of Economics and Statistics, MIT Press, vol. 69(1), pages 24-32, February.
    5. Elberfeld, Walter & Wolfstetter, Elmar, 1999. "A dynamic model of Bertrand competition with entry," International Journal of Industrial Organization, Elsevier, vol. 17(4), pages 513-525, May.
    6. Andrews,Donald W. K. & Stock,James H. (ed.), 2005. "Identification and Inference for Econometric Models," Cambridge Books, Cambridge University Press, number 9780521844413, January.
    7. John Asker & Estelle Cantillon, 2008. "Properties of scoring auctions," RAND Journal of Economics, RAND Corporation, vol. 39(1), pages 69-85, March.
    8. De Silva, Dakshina G. & Kosmopoulou, Georgia & Lamarche, Carlos, 2009. "The effect of information on the bidding and survival of entrants in procurement auctions," Journal of Public Economics, Elsevier, vol. 93(1-2), pages 56-72, February.
    9. Krishna, Vijay, 2009. "Auction Theory," Elsevier Monographs, Elsevier, edition 2, number 9780123745071.
    10. Atsushi Iimi, 2006. "Auction Reforms for Effective Official Development Assistance," Review of Industrial Organization, Springer;The Industrial Organization Society, vol. 28(2), pages 109-128, March.
    11. James H. Stock & Motohiro Yogo, 2002. "Testing for Weak Instruments in Linear IV Regression," NBER Technical Working Papers 0284, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
    12. Bajari, Patrick & Hortacsu, Ali, 2003. "The Winner's Curse, Reserve Prices, and Endogenous Entry: Empirical Insights from eBay Auctions," RAND Journal of Economics, The RAND Corporation, vol. 34(2), pages 329-355, Summer.
    13. Philip A. Haile, 2001. "Auctions with Resale Markets: An Application to U.S. Forest Service Timber Sales," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 91(3), pages 399-427, June.
    14. Menezes, Flavio M., 2008. "An Introduction to Auction Theory," OUP Catalogue, Oxford University Press, number 9780199275991.
    15. Fan, Cuihong & Wolfstetter, Elmar, 2008. "Procurement with costly bidding, optimal shortlisting, and rebates," Economics Letters, Elsevier, vol. 98(3), pages 327-334, March.
    16. Tong Li & Isabelle Perrigne, 2003. "Timber Sale Auctions with Random Reserve Prices," The Review of Economics and Statistics, MIT Press, vol. 85(1), pages 189-200, February.
    17. Srabana Gupta, 2002. "Competition and collusion in a government procurement auction market," Atlantic Economic Journal, Springer;International Atlantic Economic Society, vol. 30(1), pages 13-25, March.
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    Cited by:

    1. Kutlina-Dimitrova, Zornitsa, 2018. "Government procurement: data, trends and protectionist tendencies," DG TRADE Chief Economist Notes 2018-3, Directorate General for Trade, European Commission.
    2. Escudero, Verónica & López Mourelo, Elva & Pignatti, Clemente, 2020. "Joint provision of income and employment support: Evidence from a crisis response in Uruguay," World Development, Elsevier, vol. 134(C).
    3. Zhongmin Wang & Minbo Xu, 2016. "Empirical Evidence on Competition and Revenue in an All-Pay Contest," Review of Industrial Organization, Springer;The Industrial Organization Society, vol. 49(3), pages 429-448, November.
    4. Bedri Kamil Onur Tas, 2014. "How to Achieve Efficiency in Public Procurement Auctions," EcoMod2014 6728, EcoMod.
    5. Ravenda, Diego & Giuranno, Michele G. & Valencia-Silva, Maika M. & Argiles-Bosch, Josep M. & García-Blandón, Josep, 2020. "The effects of mafia infiltration on public procurement performance," European Journal of Political Economy, Elsevier, vol. 64(C).
    6. Eremina, Anastasia & Zoroastrova, Irina & Maksimov, Andrey, 2018. "Empirical analysis of municipal peculiarities influence on price outcomes of public purchases," Applied Econometrics, Russian Presidential Academy of National Economy and Public Administration (RANEPA), vol. 51, pages 84-101.
    7. Dengler, Benedikt, 2018. "The WTO Government Procurement Agreement as a Commitment Device: A First Appraisal," CEPR Discussion Papers 13266, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers.
    8. Ilke Onur & Bedri Kamil Onur Tas, 2019. "Optimal bidder participation in public procurement auctions," International Tax and Public Finance, Springer;International Institute of Public Finance, vol. 26(3), pages 595-617, June.
    9. Sergio A. Contreras & Andrew J. Greenlee, 2021. "Evaluating the effectiveness of ChileCompra's Entrepreneurship Centers policy," Regional Science Policy & Practice, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 13(4), pages 1262-1282, August.
    10. Wilfried Puwein & Michael Weingärtler, 2008. "Public Private Partnership in Österreich. Aktuelle Bestandsanalyse und Trends," WIFO Studies, WIFO, number 40720.
    11. Bedri Kamil Onur Tas & Ahu Genis-Gruber, 2008. "E-Procurement Savings and Competition Effect: Analysis of Cultural Differences Through a Unified Model," Working Papers 0815, TOBB University of Economics and Technology, Department of Economics.
    12. Martin Schmidt, 2015. "Price Determination in Public Procurement: A Game Theory Approach," European Financial and Accounting Journal, Prague University of Economics and Business, vol. 2015(1), pages 49-62.
    13. Sanfilippo, Marco, 2018. "Firm performance and participation in public procurement: Evidence from Sub-Saharan Africa," CEPR Discussion Papers 12752, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers.
    14. Selcuk, Cemil, 2013. "Motivated sellers and predation in the housing market," Economic Modelling, Elsevier, vol. 32(C), pages 203-214.
    15. Bedri Kamil Onur Tas, 2017. "Collusion Detection in Public Procurement with Limited Information," Working Papers 1127, Economic Research Forum, revised 08 Oct 2017.
    16. Kutlina-Dimitrova, Zornitsa, 2017. "Can we put a price on extending the scope of the GPA? First quantitative assessment," DG TRADE Chief Economist Notes 2017-1, Directorate General for Trade, European Commission.
    17. Ari, Izzet & Sari, Ramazan, 2015. "The role of feed-in tariffs in emission mitigation: Turkish case," Renewable and Sustainable Energy Reviews, Elsevier, vol. 48(C), pages 768-775.
    18. Tünde Tátrai & Gyöngyi Vörösmarty & Péter Juhász, 2024. "Intensifying Competition in Public Procurement," Public Organization Review, Springer, vol. 24(1), pages 237-257, March.

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    More about this item

    JEL classification:

    • C31 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Multiple or Simultaneous Equation Models; Multiple Variables - - - Cross-Sectional Models; Spatial Models; Treatment Effect Models; Quantile Regressions; Social Interaction Models
    • D44 - Microeconomics - - Market Structure, Pricing, and Design - - - Auctions
    • H57 - Public Economics - - National Government Expenditures and Related Policies - - - Procurement

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