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La reciprocidad y la paradoja del votante

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  • Jorge Andrés Gallego

    (Universidad Nacional de Colombia)

Abstract

This article shows that for a citizen with reciprocal preferences, voting can be a rational act. Even in elections with many voters, when the probability of being the pivotal voter is close to zero, the utility generated by strong reciprocal sentiments can compensate the material costs of voting. This paper offers a behavioral model with social preferences that represents the conditions that make voting more attractive than abstention. Using the dynamics of replication to explore the voting game evolution, it concludes that positive reciprocal sentiments promote voting for the candidate in power, while negative reciprocity promotes abstention or voting for a rival candidate.

Suggested Citation

  • Jorge Andrés Gallego, 2007. "La reciprocidad y la paradoja del votante," Revista de Economía Institucional, Universidad Externado de Colombia - Facultad de Economía, vol. 9(16), pages 149-188, January-J.
    • Handle: RePEc:rei:ecoins:v:9:y:2007:i:16:p:149-188
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    File URL: http://www.uexternado.edu.co/facecono/ecoinstitucional/workingpapers/jgallego16.pdf
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    References listed on IDEAS

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    More about this item

    Keywords

    reciprocity; paradox of voting; social preferences; evolutionary games;
    All these keywords.

    JEL classification:

    • C73 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Game Theory and Bargaining Theory - - - Stochastic and Dynamic Games; Evolutionary Games
    • D72 - Microeconomics - - Analysis of Collective Decision-Making - - - Political Processes: Rent-seeking, Lobbying, Elections, Legislatures, and Voting Behavior

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