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L?economia avvelenata del crimine ambientale

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  • Antonio Pergolizzi

    (Legambiente)

Abstract

Per definizione, la criminalità ambientale, insieme alla sua declinazione ecomafiosa, si fonda sul sistematico saccheggio delle risorse e dei beni comuni ambientali. Essa si manifesta concretamente grazie alla privatizzazione illegale di porzioni di territorio e biodiversità , e alla contestuale socializzazione dei costi. Tali costi sociali e ambientali sono enormi per la collettività e ben più gravi di quelli che l'economia ambientale mainstream riconosce come esternalità . L'articolo passa in rassegna le ricerche più recenti condotte sui crimini ambientali in Italia, mostrando che la forza delle reti ecocriminali dipende principalmente dalle politiche di prevenzione. By definition, environmental crime and the ecomafia are based on the systematic plundering of resources and environmental commons. Environmental crime is manifest in the illegal privatization of portions of land and biodiversity, and in the contextual socialization of the costs. These social and environmental costs are enormous for the community and are much more serious than the externalities documented by mainstream environmental economics. The article reviews the most recent research conducted on environmental crimes in Italy, showing that the strength of ecocriminal networks mainly depends on prevention policies.

Suggested Citation

  • Antonio Pergolizzi, 2018. "L?economia avvelenata del crimine ambientale," Moneta e Credito, Economia civile, vol. 71(284), pages 337-353.
  • Handle: RePEc:psl:moneta:2018:45
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    File URL: https://ojs.uniroma1.it/index.php/monetaecredito/article/view/14594/14183
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    References listed on IDEAS

    as
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    Full references (including those not matched with items on IDEAS)

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    More about this item

    Keywords

    Ecomafia; economia ambientale; rifiuti; reti ecocriminali;
    All these keywords.

    JEL classification:

    • K42 - Law and Economics - - Legal Procedure, the Legal System, and Illegal Behavior - - - Illegal Behavior and the Enforcement of Law

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