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La politique industrielle communautaire

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  • Emmanuel Combe
  • Jacky Fayolle
  • Françoise Milewski

Abstract

[fre] La politique industrielle communautaire est née comme une politique sectorielle, au travers de la CECA : cette institution communautaire typique d'un dirigisme actif a permis la gestion coopérative du «cycle de vie» des industries charbonnière et sidérurgique sur l'ensemble de l'après-guerre. Mais la politique industrielle européenne a bien vite éprouvé des difficultés à étendre son champ. Pour certains de ses fondateurs, l'instauration du Marché commun européen et les réglementations concurrentielles du traité de Rome devaient suffire à développer des incitations puissantes sur les industriels européens en vue de l'accès à une taille pertinente et à un niveau de compétitivité approprié sur des marchés élargis. Dans les années soixante-dix, des préoccupations d'un plus grand activisme industriel se font jour au sein des organes communautaires. Faute de moyens adéquats et en raison de la prééminence des politiques privilégiant les champions nationaux, les résultats furent limités. Certes l'espace et l'aéronautique constituent deux heureuses exceptions, où la réussite européenne est tangible ; mais, si l'intérêt européen fut en l'occurrence bien identifié et dynamisé, sa gestion n'a pas relevé directement d'une responsabilité communautaire. Au début des années quatre-vingt, le constat des insuffisances de l'action industrielle communautaire se heurte au retour du libéralisme. La politique de la concurrence prend l'avantage sur la politique industrielle et évolue dans le sens d'un «libéralisme interventionniste», qui entend exercer un contrôle rigoureux sur les aides d'Etat et freiner les regroupements industriels susceptibles d'entraver la libre concurrence. . La recherche d'un nouvel équilibre semble être à l'ordre du jour au début de la décennie quatre-vingt-dix, comme en témoignent le Livre blanc de 1 990 sur la politique industrielle et la composante industrielle du Traité de Maastricht. Ce dernier, sans aller jusqu'à parler d'une politique industrielle commune, offre des opportunités nouvelles à l'action industrielle communautaire. La doctrine de cette action reste cependant à clarifier dans un contexte où, face à l'épuisement des politiques de champions nationaux dans les secteurs jugés stratégiques, les dispositifs nationaux ont déjà largement évolué en direction de la souplesse et de la décentralisation. Des efforts s'affirment pour dépasser le dilemme entre une politique industrielle minimale, réduite à la stricte observance de la politique de concurrence, et la simple reproduction des colbertismes nationaux au niveau communautaire. L'idée d'une articulation originale entre politique technologique et politique de la concurrence, particulièrement mise en avant par les experts communautaires, est un exemple de ces efforts mais elle ne suffit pas à résoudre l'ensemble des problèmes posés par le difficile consensus sur la doctrine concurrentielle et par le mouvement de globalisation qui affecte les entreprises. Sans doute faut-il progresser dans l'élaboration des principes d'une véritable politique de coopération industrielle, dotée d'instruments juridiques et financiers lui permettant déjouer un rôle correcteur et incitatif dans la définition de relations entre les partenaires privés et publics de l'industrie qui aient la capacité de promouvoir des projets ambitieux. Cette élaboration peut tirer profit des développements théoriques récents, attentifs aussi bien aux exigences immédiates d'une concurrence praticable et régulée qu'aux implications dynamiques de la compétition, laquelle a besoin d'une diversité technologique bien gérée pour être efficace. La gamme des objectifs possibles de l'intervention publique et des instruments correspondants est clarifiée par ces apports théoriques, sachant que la réalité propre à chaque activité suppose une sélection et un agencement spécifiques de ces objectifs et instruments. [eng] The European Industrial Policy . Europe's industrial policy first appeared as a sectorial one when the European Coal and Steel Community was put in place. This highly interventionist institution proved efficient in managing the « life-cycle » of the coal and steel industries. It very quickly met with some difficulties when trying to enlarge its scope. Some of its creators relied upon the implementation of the competition's rules defined in the Rome Treaty and more generally of the Common Market. They thought those would prove enough of an incentive for european businessmen to strive towards the appropriate scale and level of productivity. However, requests for more interventionism appeared inside some of the Community's institutions during the 70's. Results were limited because few means were attached to these goals while each country tended to push its national champions forwards. Space and aircraft were two brilliant exceptions to that rule; it should be noted though that a european interest had actually been recognised but that the Community took little responsibility in the action. During the early 80"s the Community's industrial action was further weakened as the anti-interventionist mood gained strength. Competition was enhanced, industrial policy reduced; State aids were closely watched, and industrial concentration opposed. . In the early 90's a new equilibrium is sought, as can be seen in the 1990 White Paper on industrial policy and in the Maastricht Treaty. The latter, without actually calling for a Community's industrial policy, opens new fields for industrial action. The basis for such an action is still unclear. In strategic sectors, national policies have already evolved towards more flexibility and decentralisation. Efforts are repeatedly being made to avoid two dangers: an inexistent industrial policy, the duplication on the Community's scale of national interventionism. One original way to get out of this dilemna is to mix policies dealing with technolgy and competition; but it is obviously unable to solve all the problems met by firms in a global world. Progress should be made in the definition of an effective policy of industrial cooperation. Financial and legal tools should be used to modify the relationships between public and private economic actors engaged in ambitious projects. Theoretical basis for such policies are beginning to appear; they focus upon the immediate needs of competition and its long-term dynamics. Such theories help in defining the goals towards which public intervention should tend and the tools it could use, bearing in mind that each specific sector calls for a specific combination of objectives and means.

Suggested Citation

  • Emmanuel Combe & Jacky Fayolle & Françoise Milewski, 1993. "La politique industrielle communautaire," Revue de l'OFCE, Programme National Persée, vol. 43(1), pages 399-454.
  • Handle: RePEc:prs:rvofce:ofce_0751-6614_1993_num_43_1_1309
    DOI: 10.3406/ofce.1993.1309
    Note: DOI:10.3406/ofce.1993.1309
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    References listed on IDEAS

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