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Is tied aid bad for the recipient countries?

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  • Kim, Sang-Kee
  • Kim, Young-Han

Abstract

This paper examines the welfare effects of the exclusivity of foreign aid taking consideration of donor countries' strategic and self-interested economic motivations. Based on an oligopolistic model with strategic interactions between firms and governments providing foreign aid, we demonstrate that a higher exclusivity of foreign aid, taking the form of tied aid, increases the equilibrium amount of aid and the social welfare of the recipient country when the foreign aid policies are decided in a non-cooperative fashion between donor countries. However, when donor countries coordinate aid policies to maximize joint-welfare including recipient country's welfare, the lower exclusivity of foreign aid, taking the form of untied aid, will increase the equilibrium amount of aid and the global social welfare. The results implicate that when a credible enforcement mechanism for the cooperative regime for foreign aid is not available, tied aid is welfare dominant policy for both donor and recipient countries than untied aid.

Suggested Citation

  • Kim, Sang-Kee & Kim, Young-Han, 2016. "Is tied aid bad for the recipient countries?," Economic Modelling, Elsevier, vol. 53(C), pages 289-301.
    • Handle: RePEc:eee:ecmode:v:53:y:2016:i:c:p:289-301
    DOI: 10.1016/j.econmod.2015.11.025
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    3. Fahmida Khatun & Syed Yusuf Saadat & Md. Kamruzzaman, 2019. "FINANCE FOR SDGs: Addressing Governance Challenge of Aid Utilisation in Bangladesh," CPD Working Paper 125, Centre for Policy Dialogue (CPD).

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    More about this item

    Keywords

    Foreign aid; Tied aid; Untied aid; Humanitarian and self-interested motivation of aid; Official development assistances;
    All these keywords.

    JEL classification:

    • O19 - Economic Development, Innovation, Technological Change, and Growth - - Economic Development - - - International Linkages to Development; Role of International Organizations
    • F55 - International Economics - - International Relations, National Security, and International Political Economy - - - International Institutional Arrangements
    • F59 - International Economics - - International Relations, National Security, and International Political Economy - - - Other

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