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Chômage structurel et emploi dans les économies en transition

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  • André Fourçans
  • Radu Vranceanu

Abstract

[fre] Les économies en transition ont entrepris une formidable transformation organisationnelle dont l'impact sur leur marché du travail est non moins formidable. Le modèle que nous proposons analyse les facteurs structurels qui influent sur le taux de chômage, mais aussi sur l'emploi et le salaire dans les trois secteurs qui constituent notre vision de ces économies. Sont ainsi étudiés l'impact de la privatisation et de la réforme des entreprises, des indemnités de chômage et du salaire minimum. Les implications de politique économique qui peuvent en découler sont ensuite discutées. [eng] Transitional economies undertake an outstanding transformation of their organisational system which leads to significant changes in their labor market. The proposed model analyses the structural factors that affect total unemployment, but also employment and wages in three different economic sub-sectors. The impact of privatisation and enterprise reform, of unemployment benefits and minimum wage laws are thus analysed. Policy conclusions are finally drawn.

Suggested Citation

  • André Fourçans & Radu Vranceanu, 1996. "Chômage structurel et emploi dans les économies en transition," Revue Française d'Économie, Programme National Persée, vol. 11(2), pages 3-28.
    • Handle: RePEc:prs:rfreco:rfeco_0769-0479_1996_num_11_2_1001
    DOI: 10.3406/rfeco.1996.1001
    Note: DOI:10.3406/rfeco.1996.1001
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    References listed on IDEAS

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