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La théorie de l'agence commune en information complète

Author

Listed:
  • Didier Laussel
  • Michel Le Breton
  • Claude Jessua

Abstract

[fre] Cet article fournit un tableau complet de l'état actuel de la théorie de l'« agence commune » en information complète qui étudie les situations dans les­quelles un Agent unique ( le « mandataire ») choisit une action (éventuellement pluridimensionnelle) qui affecte la fonction de paiement de plusieurs autres indivi-didus (les « Principaux » ou « mandants ») qui offrent eux-mêmes à l'Agent une rémunération fonction de l'action choisie. Quelques exemples d'application de cette théorie sont donnés. [eng] We survey the theory of common agency under complete information in which an Agent chooses an action (which may be pluridimensional ) affecting the well-being of several other individuals (the Principals) which offer monetary payments contingent on the action choosen.

Suggested Citation

  • Didier Laussel & Michel Le Breton & Claude Jessua, 1996. "La théorie de l'agence commune en information complète," Revue Économique, Programme National Persée, vol. 47(3), pages 447-455.
    • Handle: RePEc:prs:reveco:reco_0035-2764_1996_num_47_3_409780
    DOI: 10.3406/reco.1996.409780
    Note: DOI:10.3406/reco.1996.409780
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    References listed on IDEAS

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    1. David Martimort, 1992. "Multi-principaux avec anti-sélection," Annals of Economics and Statistics, GENES, issue 28, pages 1-37.
    2. Bernheim, B Douglas & Whinston, Michael D, 1986. "Common Agency," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 54(4), pages 923-942, July.
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