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La France et l'Allemagne ont-elles encore intérêt à l'union monétaire ?

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  • Patrick Artus

Abstract

[fre] Nous examinons dans quelles circonstances la France et l'Allemagne ont inté­rêt tous deux à former une union monétaire et quel type de politique cette union doit mener pour être acceptée par les deux pays.. Nous faisons intervenir des différences entre les objectifs (et donc la crédibi­lité) des autorités, entre les aléas qui affectent les économies, et entre les situa­tions économiques moyennes, en essayant de représenter au mieux mais simplement l'évolution actuelle des deux pays. [eng] We examine the cases where both France and Germany both prefer to form a monetary union and the nature of the policy the central bank of the union has to pursue in order to be accepted by both countries. We introduce differences between the policy objectives (and hence the credibility), between the disturbances affecting the two countries and their medium term economic situation. We try to represent simply the current evolution of the two economies.

Suggested Citation

  • Patrick Artus, 1995. "La France et l'Allemagne ont-elles encore intérêt à l'union monétaire ?," Revue Économique, Programme National Persée, vol. 46(5), pages 1297-1310.
  • Handle: RePEc:prs:reveco:reco_0035-2764_1995_num_46_5_409734
    DOI: 10.3406/reco.1995.409734
    Note: DOI:10.3406/reco.1995.409734
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    References listed on IDEAS

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    1. Barro, Robert J. & Gordon, David B., 1983. "Rules, discretion and reputation in a model of monetary policy," Journal of Monetary Economics, Elsevier, vol. 12(1), pages 101-121.
    2. Alberto Alesina & Vittorio Grilli, 1993. "On The Feasibility Of A One‐Speed Or Multispeed European Monetary Union," Economics and Politics, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 5(2), pages 145-165, July.
    3. Tamim Bayoumi & Barry Eichengreen, 1992. "Shocking Aspects of European Monetary Unification," NBER Working Papers 3949, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
    4. Kenneth Rogoff, 1985. "The Optimal Degree of Commitment to an Intermediate Monetary Target," The Quarterly Journal of Economics, President and Fellows of Harvard College, vol. 100(4), pages 1169-1189.
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