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Le Pacte de stabilité atteint ses limites

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  • Charles Wyplosz

Abstract

[fre] Le Pacte de stabilité et de croissance (PSC) apparaît maintenant comme la plus grande déficience de l'Union européenne. Les nombreux défauts du PSC ont été longtemps identifiés et décrits. . Cet article analyse d'abord les principales lacunes du PSC. Il présente ensuite les arguments en faveur de l'utilisation de la politique budgétaire comme instrument de stabilisation macroéconomique, le seul désormais disponible au niveau national. La section suivante examine le débat en cours sur la réforme du PSC. Cet article se termine par une proposition en vue de modifier radicalement la façon dont la discipline budgétaire doit être mise en oeuvre en Europe. L'idée centrale est que les règles finissent par se heurter aux événements imprévus, tandis que les institutions peuvent être conçues de manière à fournir les bonnes incitations au bon moment. . Classification JEL : E61, E63 [eng] The stability Pact meets its fate . The Stability and Grown Pact (SGP) is now emerging as the Union's most serious deficiency. This should not come as a surprise. The many flaws of the SGP have long been identified and described. This note starts with an analysis of the main flaws of the SGP. It then presents arguments in favour of the use of fiscal policy as a tool of macroeconomic stabilization, indeed the only one left at the national level. The following section examines the current debate on SGP reform. The paper ends with a proposal to radically change the way fiscal discipline is enforced in Europe. The central idea is that rules eventually fail in the face of unexpected events, while institutions can be designed to provide the right incentives at the right time. . JEL classifications : E61, E63

Suggested Citation

  • Charles Wyplosz, 2003. "Le Pacte de stabilité atteint ses limites," Revue d'Économie Financière, Programme National Persée, vol. 71(2), pages 245-259.
    • Handle: RePEc:prs:recofi:ecofi_0987-3368_2003_num_71_2_4860
    DOI: 10.3406/ecofi.2003.4860
    Note: DOI:10.3406/ecofi.2003.4860
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    References listed on IDEAS

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    1. Barry Eichengreen & Ricardo Hausmann & Jürgen Von Hagen, 1999. "Reforming Budgetary Institutions in Latin America: The Case for a National Fiscal Council," Open Economies Review, Springer, vol. 10(4), pages 415-442, October.
    2. Marco BUTI & Daniele FRANCO & Hedwig ONGENA, 1997. "Budgeetary Policies during Recessions : Retrospective Application of the Stability and Growth Pact” to the Post-War Period," Discussion Papers (REL - Recherches Economiques de Louvain) 1997041, Université catholique de Louvain, Institut de Recherches Economiques et Sociales (IRES).
    3. Barry Eichengreen & Charles Wyplosz, 1998. "The Stability Pact: more than a minor nuisance?," Economic Policy, CEPR, CESifo, Sciences Po;CES;MSH, vol. 13(26), pages 66-113.
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    Cited by:

    1. Christian Saint-Etienne, 2005. "Finances publiques européennes : une réforme politiquement acceptable du Pacte de stabilité et de croissance," Revue d'Économie Financière, Programme National Persée, vol. 79(2), pages 333-348.
    2. Robert Raymond, 2009. "Vers l'indépendance des banques centrales et une politique monétaire européenne," Revue d'Économie Financière, Programme National Persée, vol. 8(1), pages 21-50.

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    More about this item

    JEL classification:

    • E61 - Macroeconomics and Monetary Economics - - Macroeconomic Policy, Macroeconomic Aspects of Public Finance, and General Outlook - - - Policy Objectives; Policy Designs and Consistency; Policy Coordination
    • E63 - Macroeconomics and Monetary Economics - - Macroeconomic Policy, Macroeconomic Aspects of Public Finance, and General Outlook - - - Comparative or Joint Analysis of Fiscal and Monetary Policy; Stabilization; Treasury Policy
    • E61 - Macroeconomics and Monetary Economics - - Macroeconomic Policy, Macroeconomic Aspects of Public Finance, and General Outlook - - - Policy Objectives; Policy Designs and Consistency; Policy Coordination
    • E63 - Macroeconomics and Monetary Economics - - Macroeconomic Policy, Macroeconomic Aspects of Public Finance, and General Outlook - - - Comparative or Joint Analysis of Fiscal and Monetary Policy; Stabilization; Treasury Policy

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