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La gouvernance des entreprises d’assurance : les atouts des formes mutuelles

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  • Fabrice Roth

Abstract

[fre] Les mutuelles et les sociétés de capital-actions combinent de façon différente les mécanismes de gouvernement d’entreprise que ce soit pour des raisons d’organisation de la propriété ou de réglementation. La réflexion sur ce thème privilégie le capital financier dans le processus de création de valeur. Aussi la forme mutuelle semble-t-elle moins efficace que la société par capital-actions. Or, la primauté donnée au capital financier rend peu adaptés les outils de gestion du capital humain, source de création de valeur. De plus, le management du risque tend à soustraire l’entreprise des situations à forte incertitude, pourtant liée aux stratégies innovantes. Ce problème se répercute sur celui de la gestion des informations, obérant les capacités de réaction. Sur ces points, le système de gouvernement des mutuelles peut avoir des atouts par rapport aux sociétés par capital-actions. . Classification JEL : G22, G3, L2 [eng] The governance of the insurance companies : mutual firms’ advantages . Mutual insurance companies and capital stock firms combine differently corporate governance because of their property organisation or their rule. It is true that Financial capital is favoured in the added value’s creation. So a mutual company seems less efficient than a capital stock firm. So human resources management doesn’t seem to be adapted, since it is also a source of added value creation. Furthermore, risk management tends to remove the company from strong uncertainty, nevertheless close to innovative strategies. This problem affects the information management, compromising the reaction’s capacities. On these points, the system of mutual insurance companies’ governance has advantages over capital stock societies. . JEL classifications : G22, G3, L2

Suggested Citation

  • Fabrice Roth, 2002. "La gouvernance des entreprises d’assurance : les atouts des formes mutuelles," Revue d'Économie Financière, Programme National Persée, vol. 67(3), pages 181-192.
    • Handle: RePEc:prs:recofi:ecofi_0987-3368_2002_num_67_3_3580
    DOI: 10.3406/ecofi.2002.3580
    Note: DOI:10.3406/ecofi.2002.3580
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    References listed on IDEAS

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    1. Fabrice Roth, 2000. "Gouvernement des entreprises et stratégie du dirigeant:une étude clinique dans le secteur de l'assurance," Revue Finance Contrôle Stratégie, revues.org, vol. 3(4), pages 179-199, December.
    2. Raghuram G. Rajan & Luigi Zingales, 1998. "The Governance of the New Enterprise," CRSP working papers 487, Center for Research in Security Prices, Graduate School of Business, University of Chicago.
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    Cited by:

    1. Stéphane Mottet, 2005. "Mutualité d'assurance et globalisation financière," Revue d'Économie Financière, Programme National Persée, vol. 80(3), pages 287-295.
    2. Fabrice Roth, 2012. "Crise et régulation des marchés financiers : Quel impact sur les formes mutuelles dans l'assurance ?," Working Papers halshs-00692342, HAL.

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    More about this item

    JEL classification:

    • G22 - Financial Economics - - Financial Institutions and Services - - - Insurance; Insurance Companies; Actuarial Studies
    • G3 - Financial Economics - - Corporate Finance and Governance
    • L2 - Industrial Organization - - Firm Objectives, Organization, and Behavior
    • G22 - Financial Economics - - Financial Institutions and Services - - - Insurance; Insurance Companies; Actuarial Studies
    • G3 - Financial Economics - - Corporate Finance and Governance
    • L2 - Industrial Organization - - Firm Objectives, Organization, and Behavior

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