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Les cofinancements publics : des pratiques aux rationalités

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  • Guy Gilbert
  • Jean-Claude Thoenig

Abstract

[eng] Cross subsidizing public programs and projects : the rationality of practices. The article suggests a conceptual definition of cross subsidization which relies upon a typology. Two parameters are taken into account : the degree of autonomy between the partners, the degree of commitment binding them. Some preliminary results and data are discussed which have been gathered by a study of funding practices and budgetary allocations within a French region. Cross subsidization is a very common practice used by a large variety of public authorities, subnational and national as well as the European Union, which in some cases such as the regional councils represent the majority of the funded projects. Such highly complex ventures are either one shot funding or pluriannual frameworks, more or less formalized, and involving two or more partners in a large spectrum of policy domains. They are well accepted, regulated by informal rules of behavior and exchange, and fulfill a latent function of interorganizational integration. The article discusses the relevance of various sets of hypotheses derived from economics and sociology, and suggests the necessity to combine approaches which explain the content as well as the process of such financial arrangements, given the fact that they occur each of them not as separate transactions but as recurrent solutions. [fre] L’article fournit une définition du cofinancement qui s’appuie sur une typologie permettant de classer les configurations empiriques. Deux paramètres sont retenus : le mode d’association entre deux ou plusieurs collectivités, la position respective ou le degré d’autonomie des cofinanceurs impliqués. Quelques résultats préliminaires sont présentés d’une étude empirique menée dans une région française. Les cofinancements apparaissent quantitativement comme une pratique dominante qui déborde largement le cadre pluriannuel formalisé du contrat de plan entre l’État et la région. D’autres faits stylisés tirés d’une étude qualitative montrent leur caractère peu controversé. Les cofinancements publics constituent des conventions socialement régulées et servent de liant entre un ensemble hétéroclite de partenaires publics et privés. Enfin, l’article s’interroge sur les hypothèses susceptibles d’expliquer le recours des financeurs à ces procédures plus ou moins formalisées. Il suggère la nécessité de combiner des approches substantialistes et des approches procédurales dans une double perspective d’économie publique et de sociologie organisationnelle et politique.

Suggested Citation

  • Guy Gilbert & Jean-Claude Thoenig, 1999. "Les cofinancements publics : des pratiques aux rationalités," Revue d'Économie Financière, Programme National Persée, vol. 51(1), pages 45-78.
  • Handle: RePEc:prs:recofi:ecofi_0987-3368_1999_num_51_1_3368
    DOI: 10.3406/ecofi.1999.3368
    Note: DOI:10.3406/ecofi.1999.3368
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    References listed on IDEAS

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    1. Cremer, Jaques & Estache, Antonio & Seabright, Paul & DEC, 1994. "The decentralization of public services : lessons from the theory of the firm," Policy Research Working Paper Series 1345, The World Bank.
    2. D. A. Heald, 1997. "Public policy towards cross subsidy," Annals of Public and Cooperative Economics, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 68(4), pages 591-623, December.
    3. Martimort, David, 1996. "The multiprincipal nature of government," European Economic Review, Elsevier, vol. 40(3-5), pages 673-685, April.
    4. Curien, Nicolas, 1991. "The theory and measure of cross-subsidies : An application to the telecommunications industry," International Journal of Industrial Organization, Elsevier, vol. 9(1), pages 73-108, March.
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