Keeping Both Eyes Wide Open: The Life of a Competitive Authority among Sectoral Regulators
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- Barros, Pedro & Nilssen, Tore & Hoernig, Steffen, 2008. "Keeping Both Eyes Wide Open: The Life of a Competition Authority Among Sectoral Regulators," CEPR Discussion Papers 6861, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers.
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More about this item
Keywords
Competitive authority; sectoral regulators; regulatory bias;All these keywords.
JEL classification:
- H11 - Public Economics - - Structure and Scope of Government - - - Structure and Scope of Government
- L40 - Industrial Organization - - Antitrust Issues and Policies - - - General
- L51 - Industrial Organization - - Regulation and Industrial Policy - - - Economics of Regulation
NEP fields
This paper has been announced in the following NEP Reports:- NEP-REG-2009-01-31 (Regulation)
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