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Performance absolue ou relative ? Comment les établissements français choisissent-ils leurs primes salariales ?

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  • Joseph Lanfranchi
  • Katia Dupuy

Abstract

[eng] Absolute or Relative Performance : How do French Firms Choose their Wage Bonuses ? . This article analyses employers ’ choice to base merit bonuses on relative performance . The relative element consists in comparing workers ’ output and its major advantage is to eliminate the mutual uncertainty they bear . However , bonuses based on relative performance theoretically encourage workers not to cooperate with their colleagues . Using a primary sample of 15,859 private-sector French firms in 1992 , we show that bonuses based on relative performance are more likely to be chosen when output and sales fluctuate . In contrast , they are used less frequently when firms adopt an organisation of work based on task-sharing and cooperation between workers . Key-words : performance-related bonuses , relative performance , organisation of work [fre] Cet article analyse le choix des employeurs de fonder les primes de mérite sur la base de la performance relative . L ’ évaluation relative consiste à comparer les performances productives des travailleurs . Son avantage majeur est d ’ éliminer l ’ incertitude commune supportée par ces derniers . Toutefois , les primes fondées sur la performance relative incitent théoriquement les travailleurs à ne pas coopérer avec leurs collègues . Au moyen d ’ un échantillon originel de 15 859 établissements français du secteur privé en 1992 , nous montrons qu ’ en cas de fluctuations productives et commerciales , les primes fondées sur la performance relative ont une probabilité plus importante d ’ être choisies . En revanche , lorsque les établissements adoptent une organisation du travail préconisant partage des tâches et coopération des travailleurs , elles sont moins fréquemment utilisées . Mots-clés : primes de performance , performance relative , organisation du travail

Suggested Citation

  • Joseph Lanfranchi & Katia Dupuy, 2004. "Performance absolue ou relative ? Comment les établissements français choisissent-ils leurs primes salariales ?," Économie et Prévision, Programme National Persée, vol. 162(1), pages 71-94.
    • Handle: RePEc:prs:ecoprv:ecop_0249-4744_2004_num_162_1_6934
    DOI: 10.3406/ecop.2004.6934
    Note: DOI:10.3406/ecop.2004.6934
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