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Les accords volontaires dans la politique environnementale : une mise en perspective de leur nature et de leur efficacité

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  • Matthieu Glachant

Abstract

[spa] Los acuerdos voluntarios en la política medioambiental : una puesta en perspectiva de su naturaleza y su eficacia, . por Matthieu Glachant.. . Este artículo propone un análisis de lo que fundamenta la especificidad de los acuerdos voluntarios, las negociaciones entre la administración y las firmas. Distinguiendo analíticamente el objetivo social de descontaminación, es decir la cantidad global de contaminación que el acuerdo prétende suprimir, y los medios para alcanzar este objetivo, una disimetría aparece. La discusión de los objetivos no puede dar lugar a un acuerdo por falta de la posibilidad de formulación de una amenaza creíble por la administración. En cambio, la discusión de los medios ve aparecer negociaciones descentralizadas entre las firmas ventajosas desde el punto de vista de la eficacia desde una óptica de asignación de recursos. Estos resultados se discuten ilustrândolos con ejemplos de acuerdos existentes. [ger] Die freiwilligen Vereinbarunsen in der Umweltpoljtik: eine perspektivische Betrachtung inrer Art und ihrer Wirksamkeit, . von Matthieu Glachant.. . In diesem Artikel wird eine Analyse dessen vorgeschlagen, was der Besonderheit der freiwilligen Vereinbarungen, den Verhandlungen zwischen Behörden und Unternehmen zugrunde liegt. Bei einer analytischen Unterscheidung zwischen einerseits dem gesellschaftlichen Ziel der Umweltentlastung, das heißt der globalen Verschmutzungsmenge, die durch die Vereinbarung beseitigt werden soil, und andererseits den Mitteln zur Erreichung dieses Zieles wird eine Unsymmetrie sichtbar. Die Diskussion über die Zielsetzungen kann zu keiner Vereinbarung führen, wenn die Behörden nicht über die Möglichkeit einer glaubwürdigen Drohung verfügen. Dagegen treten bei der Diskussion über die Mittel dezentralisierte Verhandlungen zwischen den Unternehmen zutage, die hinsichtlich der Leistungsstärke des Faktoreinsatzes Vorteile aufweisen. Diskutiert werden diese Ergebnisse anhand von Beispielen bereits bestehender Vereinbarungen. [eng] Putting the Nature and Efficiency of Voluntary Agreements in Environmental Policy into Perspective, . by Matthieu Glachant.. . This article puts forward an analysis of the factors underlying the specific nature of voluntary agreements in the form of negotiations between government and companies. Adissymmetry is revealed by the analytic differentiation between the social goal of eliminating pollution, i.e. the total amount of pollution that the agreement aims to expel, and the means used to achieve this objective. The consideration of goals cannot lead to an agreement when the government is unable to express a credible threat. However, the consideration of means gives rise to decentralized negotiations between firms, which are advantageous from the point of view of allocative efficiency. These results are discussed using examples of existing agreements. [fre] Les accords volontaires dans la politique environnementale : une mise en perspective de leur nature et leur efficacité, . par Matthieu Glachant.. . Cet article propose une analyse de ce qui fonde la spécificité des accords volontaires, les négociations entre l'administration et les firmes. En distinguant analytiquement l'objectif social de dépollution, c'est-à-dire la quantité globale de pollution que l'accord vise à supprimer, et les moyens pour atteindre cet objectif, une dissymétrie apparaît. La discussion des objectifs ne peut donner lieu à un accord faute de la possibilité de formulation d'une menace crédible par l'administration. En revanche, la discussion des moyens voit apparaître des négociations décentralisée entre les firmes avantageuses du point de vue de l'efficacité allocative. Ces résultats sont discutés à la lumière d'exemples d'accords existants.

Suggested Citation

  • Matthieu Glachant, 1995. "Les accords volontaires dans la politique environnementale : une mise en perspective de leur nature et de leur efficacité," Économie et Prévision, Programme National Persée, vol. 117(1), pages 49-59.
  • Handle: RePEc:prs:ecoprv:ecop_0249-4744_1995_num_117_1_5713
    DOI: 10.3406/ecop.1995.5713
    Note: DOI:10.3406/ecop.1995.5713
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    2. Bomsel, O. & Borkey, P. & Glachant, M. & Leveque, F., 1996. "Is there room for environmental self-regulation in the mining sector?," Resources Policy, Elsevier, vol. 22(1-2), pages 79-86.
    3. Charlotte Demonsant & Armand Hatchuel & Kevin Levillain & Blanche Segrestin, 2021. "De la ressource commune au péril commun : Repenser nos modèles de l'action climatique," Post-Print hal-03630940, HAL.

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