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L'un transmet, l'autre hérite..

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  • André Masson
  • Anne Gotman

Abstract

[ger] Der eine überträgt, der andere erbt... . von Anne Gotman, André Masson.. . Der neoklassische Ansatz hinsichtlich der Erbschaft ist völlig prospektiv und konzentriert sich auf den Horizont und auf die Gründe des Sparers als möglicher Erblasser für die Übertragung. Die Familiensoziologie hat dagegen eine entschieden retrospektive Betrachtungsweise dieses Phänomens gewählt und gibt der Untersuchung der Beziehungen zwischen dem Erben und der Familie, aus der er hervorgeht, den Vorzug. Sie schlägt ein Mittel vor, um die "blinde Komponente" zu erhellen, die Lücke im wirtschaftlichen Ansatz hinzuzufügen, nämlich die Beziehungen des Wirtschaftssubjekts zu seiner familiären Vergangenheit und zu den von den Eltern übertragenen Gütern. . Aus einer psychosoziologischen Studie über die Art der Aneignung ererbten Immobilien, die auf der Grundlage semidirektiver Gespräche mit einer Stichprobe von Erben aus jüngster Zeit durchgeführt wurde und bei der der Schwerpunkt auf dem Gegensatz zwischen "behalten" und "verkaufen" lag, geht hervor, daß diese Verwendungsentscheidung anscheinend von der Wahl zwischen zwei mitunter widersprüchlichen Logiken abhängt: und zwar einerseits einer retrospektiven Logik der "Familiensituation", in der das Kind seine Wahl dem affektiven oder symbolischen Wert entsprechend, den es dem Vermögenswert entgegenbringt, und den ggf . von seinen Eltern geäußerten Wünschen entsprechend trifft; sowie andererseits eine prospektive Logik des persönlichen Interesses, das einen rein wirtschaftlichen Charakter hat. Allein eine bidimensionale neoklassische Rationalität, bei der ein interner Zusammenhang zwischen diesem prospektiven "Ich" und dem retrospektiven "Ich" hergestellt würde, könnte a priori die beobachteten Verwendungsentscheidungen erklären. [spa] Uno transmite, otro hereda... . por Anne Gotman y André Masson.. . El enfoque neoclásico de la herencia es totalmente prospectivo, está centrado en el horizonte y en los motivos de transmisión del ahorrador considerado como legante potential. Al contrario, la sociología familiar adopta una visión resueltamente retrospectiva del fenómeno y da prioridad al estudio de las relaciones del heredero con su f amilia original. Además, sugiere un método para remediar la tarea a ciegas, el eslabón faltante del enfoque económico: las relaciones del agente con su pasado familiar y los bienes recibidos de los padres. . Un análisis psicosociológico del modo de apropiación de los bienes inmobiliarios heredados, centrado en la oposición entre conservar o vender y realizado a partir de entrevistas semidirectivas con una muestra de personas que heredaron en fecha reciente, muestra que esta decisión de asignación parece depender del arbitraje entre dos lógicas a veces contradictorias: una lógica retrospectiva de "situación familiar", en que el hijo toma sus decisiones atendiendo a la dimensión afectiva o simbólica que otorga al bien heredado y los deseos que hayan expresado sus padres; y una lógica prospectiva de interés personal, de tipo puramente económico. Sólo una racionalidad neoclásica bidimensional, que intègre el juego interno entre estos dos "yo", prospectivo y retrospectivo, permitiría reflejar a priori las decisiones de asignación observadas. [fre] L'un transmet, l'autre hérite... . par Anne Gotman, André M asson.. . L'approche néo-classique de l'héritage est totalement prospective, axée sur l'horizon et sur les motifs de transmission de l'épargnant en tant que léguant éventuel. La sociologie de la famille adopte au contraire une vision résolument rétrospective du phénomène et privilégie l'étude des relations de l'héritier avec sa famille d'origine. Elle suggère un moyen de remédier à ce qui constitue la tache aveugle, le chaînon manquant de l'approche économique : les rapports de l'agent à son passé familial et aux biens reçus des parents. . Menée à partir d'entretiens semi-directifs sur un échantillon d'héritiers de date récente, une analyse psycho-sociologique du mode d'appropriation de l'immobilier hérité, centrée autour de l'opposition entre garder ou vendre, montre ainsi que cette décision d'affectation dépendrait de l'arbitrage entre deux logiques parfois contradictoires : une logique rétrospective de "situation familiale", où l'enfant règle ses choix selon la dimension affective ou symbolique qu'il prête au bien et les désirs éventuels exprimés par ses parents; une logique prospective d'intérêt personnel, d'ordre purement économique. Seule une rationalité néo-classique bi-dimensionnelle, qui mettrait en scène le jeu interne entre ces deux "moi" prospectif et rétrospectif, permettrait a priori de rendre compte des décisions d'affectation observées. [eng] One transfers, another inherits... . by Anne Gotman, André Masson.. . The neoclassical approach of inheritance is totally forward-looking, based on the reasons the saver, as a potential bequeather, transfers property. Family sociology, on the other hand, has a clearly backward-looking view of inheritance, based on the relationship between the heir and his family. It provides a possible missing link in the economic approach chain, ie the individual's relationship with his family background and with the property inherited from his parents. A psycho-sociological analysis of the way real property is inherited, based on semi-guided interviews of a sample of recent inheritors, the question being whether the heir will keep his property or sell it, shows that the decision depends in part on the coming together of two somewhat contradictory systems of logic: a backward-looking 'logic of kinship', where the descendants's choices are governed by the sentimental or symbolic value an article of property may have for him and by what his parents may want and a forward-looking logic based on self-interest, which is purely economic in nature. Only bidimensional, neoclassical rationality, bringing the inner conflict between a forward-looking 'self' and a backward-looking 'self' to bear, can account for the observed choices regarding the appropriation of property.

Suggested Citation

  • André Masson & Anne Gotman, 1991. "L'un transmet, l'autre hérite..," Économie et Prévision, Programme National Persée, vol. 100(4), pages 207-230.
  • Handle: RePEc:prs:ecoprv:ecop_0249-4744_1991_num_100_4_5266
    DOI: 10.3406/ecop.1991.5266
    Note: DOI:10.3406/ecop.1991.5266
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    4. Luc Arrondel & André Masson, 1991. "Que nous enseignent les enquêtes sur les transferts patrimoniaux en France ?," Économie et Prévision, Programme National Persée, vol. 100(4), pages 93-128.
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    1. Bertrand Crettez & Claire Loupias & Philippe Michel, 1997. "Croissance et modes de propriété des terres," Annals of Economics and Statistics, GENES, issue 48, pages 119-146.
    2. repec:adr:anecst:y:1997:i:48:p:07 is not listed on IDEAS

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