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Competition, coordination and anti-trust policy

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  • Claude d'Aspremont
  • Massimo Motta

Abstract

[fre] Dans un modèle simple de différenciation horizontale avec libre entrée (l'entrée se décidant à une étape préliminaire), on montre qu'une concurrence "forte" au sens de Bertrand peut être associée à structure industrielle plus concentrée et à un bien-être collectif moins élevé qu'une concurrence "raisonnable" au sens de Cournot. [eng] In a simple model of horizontal differentiation with free entry (entry occurring in a preliminary stage), it is shown that "tough" price competition, in the Bertrand sense, may be associated to higher industry concentration and lower collective welfare than "soft" price competition in the Cournot sense.

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  • Claude d'Aspremont & Massimo Motta, 2000. "Competition, coordination and anti-trust policy," Cahiers d'Économie Politique, Programme National Persée, vol. 37(1), pages 141-154.
    • Handle: RePEc:prs:caecpo:cep_0154-8344_2000_num_37_1_1292
    DOI: 10.3406/cep.2000.1292
    Note: DOI:10.3406/cep.2000.1292
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