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Curiosity of Pay-Per-Bid Auctions: Evidence from Bonus.cz Auction Site

Author

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  • Miroslav Svoboda
  • Petr Bocák

Abstract

This paper analyses the pay-per-bid auctions which have appeared recently on the Internet and scored an immediate business success. In these auctions bidders pay a small, but irrevocable fee each time they want to increase the price. In this paper we test the model suggested by Platt, Price and Tappen (2010), which forecasts the distribution of closing prices depending on the item's value, bid fee and price increment. The data from the Czech leading auction site Bonus.cz were chosen for the test. Observed closing prices distribution of about 69 % of commonly auctioned items fits the model. However, we find some theoretical and practical flaws in the model. Contrary to the model predictions, we observed that auctions with smaller price increments generated significantly higher revenue than auctions with higher price increments. We suggest that bidders who favour skewness in payoff distribution cause auctions with lower price increment run longer and therefore explain this discrepancy.

Suggested Citation

  • Miroslav Svoboda & Petr Bocák, 2013. "Curiosity of Pay-Per-Bid Auctions: Evidence from Bonus.cz Auction Site," Prague Economic Papers, Prague University of Economics and Business, vol. 2013(3), pages 418-432.
    • Handle: RePEc:prg:jnlpep:v:2013:y:2013:i:3:id:460:p:418-432
    DOI: 10.18267/j.pep.460
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    References listed on IDEAS

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    1. Brennan C. Platt & Joseph Price & Henry Tappen, 2010. "Pay-to-Bid Auctions," NBER Working Papers 15695, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
    2. Michael R. Baye & Dan Kovenock & Casper G. Vries, 1996. "The all-pay auction with complete information," Springer Books, in: Roger D. Congleton & Arye L. Hillman & Kai A. Konrad (ed.), 40 Years of Research on Rent Seeking 1, pages 209-223, Springer.
    3. Hinnosaar, Toomas, 2016. "Penny auctions," International Journal of Industrial Organization, Elsevier, vol. 48(C), pages 59-87.
    4. Garrett, Thomas A. & Sobel, Russell S., 1999. "Gamblers favor skewness, not risk: Further evidence from United States' lottery games," Economics Letters, Elsevier, vol. 63(1), pages 85-90, April.
    5. Joseph Golec & Maurry Tamarkin, 1998. "Bettors Love Skewness, Not Risk, at the Horse Track," Journal of Political Economy, University of Chicago Press, vol. 106(1), pages 205-225, February.
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    More about this item

    Keywords

    skewness; risk; auction theory; pay-per-bid auction; auction modelling;
    All these keywords.

    JEL classification:

    • C12 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Econometric and Statistical Methods and Methodology: General - - - Hypothesis Testing: General
    • C51 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Econometric Modeling - - - Model Construction and Estimation
    • D44 - Microeconomics - - Market Structure, Pricing, and Design - - - Auctions
    • L81 - Industrial Organization - - Industry Studies: Services - - - Retail and Wholesale Trade; e-Commerce
    • L83 - Industrial Organization - - Industry Studies: Services - - - Sports; Gambling; Restaurants; Recreation; Tourism

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