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Bankruptcy and firm finance

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  • Stefan Krasa
  • Tridib Sharma
  • Anne Villamil

Abstract

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Suggested Citation

  • Stefan Krasa & Tridib Sharma & Anne Villamil, 2008. "Bankruptcy and firm finance," Economic Theory, Springer;Society for the Advancement of Economic Theory (SAET), vol. 36(2), pages 239-266, August.
  • Handle: RePEc:spr:joecth:v:36:y:2008:i:2:p:239-266
    DOI: 10.1007/s00199-007-0267-y
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    References listed on IDEAS

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    1. Rafael La Porta & Florencio Lopez-de-Silanes & Andrei Shleifer & Robert W. Vishny, 1998. "Law and Finance," Journal of Political Economy, University of Chicago Press, vol. 106(6), pages 1113-1155, December.
    2. Guillaume Carlier & Ludovic Renou, 2005. "A costly state verification model with diversity of opinions," Post-Print hal-00404932, HAL.
    3. Williamson, Stephen D., 1986. "Costly monitoring, financial intermediation, and equilibrium credit rationing," Journal of Monetary Economics, Elsevier, vol. 18(2), pages 159-179, September.
    4. Hyeok Jeong & Robert Townsend, 2007. "Sources of TFP growth: occupational choice and financial deepening," Economic Theory, Springer;Society for the Advancement of Economic Theory (SAET), vol. 32(1), pages 179-221, July.
    5. G. Carlier & L. Renou, 2006. "Debt contracts with ex-ante and ex-post asymmetric information: an example," Economic Theory, Springer;Society for the Advancement of Economic Theory (SAET), vol. 28(2), pages 461-473, June.
    6. Krasa, Stefan & Sharma, Tridib & Villamil, Anne P., 2005. "Debt contracts and cooperative improvements," Journal of Mathematical Economics, Elsevier, vol. 41(7), pages 857-874, November.
    7. Stefan Krasa & Anne P. Villamil, 2000. "Optimal Contracts when Enforcement Is a Decision Variable," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 68(1), pages 119-134, January.
    8. Townsend, Robert M., 1979. "Optimal contracts and competitive markets with costly state verification," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 21(2), pages 265-293, October.
    9. repec:dau:papers:123456789/7447 is not listed on IDEAS
    10. Douglas Gale & Martin Hellwig, 1985. "Incentive-Compatible Debt Contracts: The One-Period Problem," The Review of Economic Studies, Review of Economic Studies Ltd, vol. 52(4), pages 647-663.
    11. Igor Livshits & James MacGee & Michèle Tertilt, 2007. "Consumer Bankruptcy: A Fresh Start," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 97(1), pages 402-418, March.
    12. Satyajit Chatterjee & Dean Corbae & Makoto Nakajima & José-Víctor Ríos-Rull, 2007. "A Quantitative Theory of Unsecured Consumer Credit with Risk of Default," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 75(6), pages 1525-1589, November.
    13. Gaetano Antinolfi & Elisabeth Huybens, 2004. "Domestic financial market frictions, unrestricted international capital flows, and crises in small open economies," Economic Theory, Springer;Society for the Advancement of Economic Theory (SAET), vol. 24(4), pages 811-837, November.
    14. Elisabeth Huybens & Gaetano Antinolfi, 1998. "Capital accumulation and real exchange rate behavior in a small open economy with credit market frictions," Economic Theory, Springer;Society for the Advancement of Economic Theory (SAET), vol. 12(3), pages 461-488.
    15. Boyd, John H. & Levine, Ross & Smith, Bruce D., 2001. "The impact of inflation on financial sector performance," Journal of Monetary Economics, Elsevier, vol. 47(2), pages 221-248, April.
    16. Costas Azariadis & Leo Kaas, 2007. "Is dynamic general equilibrium a theory of everything?," Economic Theory, Springer;Society for the Advancement of Economic Theory (SAET), vol. 32(1), pages 13-41, July.
    17. Boyd, John H & Smith, Bruce D, 1994. "How Good Are Standard Debt Contracts? Stochastic versus Nonstochastic Monitoring in a Costly State Verification Environment," The Journal of Business, University of Chicago Press, vol. 67(4), pages 539-561, October.
    18. Guillaume Carlier & Ludovic Renou, 2005. "A costly state verification model with diversity of opinions," Economic Theory, Springer;Society for the Advancement of Economic Theory (SAET), vol. 25(2), pages 497-504, February.
    Full references (including those not matched with items on IDEAS)

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    More about this item

    Keywords

    Enforcement; Default; Bankruptcy; Legal environment; Contracts; Limited commitment; Debt; Creditor protection; Inflation; E61; G10; K40;
    All these keywords.

    JEL classification:

    • E61 - Macroeconomics and Monetary Economics - - Macroeconomic Policy, Macroeconomic Aspects of Public Finance, and General Outlook - - - Policy Objectives; Policy Designs and Consistency; Policy Coordination
    • G10 - Financial Economics - - General Financial Markets - - - General (includes Measurement and Data)
    • K40 - Law and Economics - - Legal Procedure, the Legal System, and Illegal Behavior - - - General

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