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Bankruptcy and firm finance

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  • Stefan Krasa
  • Tridib Sharma
  • Anne Villamil

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  • Stefan Krasa & Tridib Sharma & Anne Villamil, 2008. "Bankruptcy and firm finance," Economic Theory, Springer;Society for the Advancement of Economic Theory (SAET), vol. 36(2), pages 239-266, August.
    • Handle: RePEc:spr:joecth:v:36:y:2008:i:2:p:239-266
    DOI: 10.1007/s00199-007-0267-y
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    References listed on IDEAS

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    6. Williamson, Stephen D., 1986. "Costly monitoring, financial intermediation, and equilibrium credit rationing," Journal of Monetary Economics, Elsevier, vol. 18(2), pages 159-179, September.
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    11. G. Carlier & L. Renou, 2006. "Debt contracts with ex-ante and ex-post asymmetric information: an example," Economic Theory, Springer;Society for the Advancement of Economic Theory (SAET), vol. 28(2), pages 461-473, June.
    12. Krasa, Stefan & Sharma, Tridib & Villamil, Anne P., 2005. "Debt contracts and cooperative improvements," Journal of Mathematical Economics, Elsevier, vol. 41(7), pages 857-874, November.
    13. Boyd, John H & Smith, Bruce D, 1994. "How Good Are Standard Debt Contracts? Stochastic versus Nonstochastic Monitoring in a Costly State Verification Environment," The Journal of Business, University of Chicago Press, vol. 67(4), pages 539-561, October.
    14. Stefan Krasa & Anne P. Villamil, 2000. "Optimal Contracts when Enforcement Is a Decision Variable," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 68(1), pages 119-134, January.
    15. Townsend, Robert M., 1979. "Optimal contracts and competitive markets with costly state verification," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 21(2), pages 265-293, October.
    16. repec:dau:papers:123456789/7447 is not listed on IDEAS
    17. Guillaume Carlier & Ludovic Renou, 2005. "A costly state verification model with diversity of opinions," Economic Theory, Springer;Society for the Advancement of Economic Theory (SAET), vol. 25(2), pages 497-504, February.
    18. Douglas Gale & Martin Hellwig, 1985. "Incentive-Compatible Debt Contracts: The One-Period Problem," The Review of Economic Studies, Review of Economic Studies Ltd, vol. 52(4), pages 647-663.
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    Citations

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    Cited by:

    1. Jorge Alonso-Ortiz & Esteban Colla & José-María Da-Rocha, 2017. "The productivity cost of sovereign default: evidence from the European debt crisis," Economic Theory, Springer;Society for the Advancement of Economic Theory (SAET), vol. 64(4), pages 611-633, December.
    2. Latchezar Popov, 2014. "Enforcement frictions and optimal lending contracts," Economic Theory, Springer;Society for the Advancement of Economic Theory (SAET), vol. 57(1), pages 195-222, September.
    3. M. Peiris & Alexandros Vardoulakis, 2015. "Collateral and the efficiency of monetary policy," Economic Theory, Springer;Society for the Advancement of Economic Theory (SAET), vol. 59(3), pages 579-603, August.
    4. Gabriel Madeira, 2014. "Legal enforcement, default and heterogeneity of project-financing contracts," Annals of Finance, Springer, vol. 10(4), pages 569-602, November.
    5. Zhixiong Zeng, 2013. "A theory of the non-neutrality of money with banking frictions and bank recapitalization," Economic Theory, Springer;Society for the Advancement of Economic Theory (SAET), vol. 52(2), pages 729-754, March.
    6. Antinolfi, Gaetano & Carli, Francesco, 2015. "Costly monitoring, dynamic incentives, and default," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 159(PA), pages 105-119.
    7. Antonio Antunes & Tiago Cavalcanti & Anne Villamil, 2006. "The Effect of Financial Repression & Enforcement on Entrepreneurship and Economic Development," Development Economics Working Papers 21816, East Asian Bureau of Economic Research.
    8. Mahmoud Nabi & Taoufik Rajhi, 2013. "Banking, contract enforcement and economic growth," International Review of Economics, Springer;Happiness Economics and Interpersonal Relations (HEIRS), vol. 60(1), pages 83-100, March.
    9. Igor Livshits, 2015. "Recent Developments In Consumer Credit And Default Literature," Journal of Economic Surveys, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 29(4), pages 594-613, September.
    10. Nabi, Mahmoud Sami & Suliman, Mohamed Osman, 2011. "Credit rationing, interest rates and capital accumulation," Economic Modelling, Elsevier, vol. 28(6), pages 2719-2729.
    11. David Rappoport & Alexandros Vardoulakis & David Arseneau, 2015. "Secondary Market Liquidity and the Optimal Capital Structure," 2015 Meeting Papers 1274, Society for Economic Dynamics.
    12. Houari, Oussama, 2022. "Uncertainty shocks and business cycles in the US: New insights from the last three decades," Economic Modelling, Elsevier, vol. 109(C).
    13. Neus Herranz & Stefan Krasa & Anne P. Villamil, 2015. "Entrepreneurs, Risk Aversion, and Dynamic Firms," Journal of Political Economy, University of Chicago Press, vol. 123(5), pages 1133-1176.
    14. Weerachart Kilenthong, 2011. "Collateral premia and risk sharing under limited commitment," Economic Theory, Springer;Society for the Advancement of Economic Theory (SAET), vol. 46(3), pages 475-501, April.
    15. Akyol, Ahmet & Athreya, Kartik, 2011. "Credit and self-employment," Journal of Economic Dynamics and Control, Elsevier, vol. 35(3), pages 363-385, March.
    16. Karel Janda, 2007. "Optimal Debt Contracts in Emerging Markets with Multiple Investors," Prague Economic Papers, Prague University of Economics and Business, vol. 2007(2), pages 115-129.
    17. Hans Hvide & Tore Leite, 2010. "Optimal debt contracts under costly enforcement," Economic Theory, Springer;Society for the Advancement of Economic Theory (SAET), vol. 44(1), pages 149-165, July.
    18. Kartik Athreya & Ahmet Akyol, 2007. "Unsecured Credit and Self-Employment," 2007 Meeting Papers 49, Society for Economic Dynamics.
    19. José-María Da-Rocha & Eduardo-Luis Giménez & Francisco-Xavier Lores, 2013. "Self-fulfilling crises with default and devaluation," Economic Theory, Springer;Society for the Advancement of Economic Theory (SAET), vol. 53(3), pages 499-535, August.
    20. Neus Herranz & Stefan Krasa & Anne P. Villamil, 2017. "Entrepreneurs, legal institutions and firm dynamics," Economic Theory, Springer;Society for the Advancement of Economic Theory (SAET), vol. 63(1), pages 263-285, January.
    21. Antunes, António & Cavalcanti, Tiago & Villamil, Anne, 2008. "The effect of financial repression and enforcement on entrepreneurship and economic development," Journal of Monetary Economics, Elsevier, vol. 55(2), pages 278-297, March.
    22. Antunes, Antonio R. & Cavalcanti, Tiago V. de V., 2007. "Start up costs, limited enforcement, and the hidden economy," European Economic Review, Elsevier, vol. 51(1), pages 203-224, January.
    23. Cesar Tamayo, 2015. "Investor protection and optimal contracts under risk aversion and costly state verification," Economic Theory, Springer;Society for the Advancement of Economic Theory (SAET), vol. 59(3), pages 547-577, August.
    24. Josef Schosser & Jochen Wilhelm, 2018. "Costly state verification and truthtelling: a note on the theory of debt contracts," Economic Theory Bulletin, Springer;Society for the Advancement of Economic Theory (SAET), vol. 6(2), pages 129-139, October.
    25. Nabi, Mahmoud Sami, 2015. "Equity-financing, income inequality and capital accumulation," Economic Modelling, Elsevier, vol. 46(C), pages 322-333.

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    More about this item

    Keywords

    Enforcement; Default; Bankruptcy; Legal environment; Contracts; Limited commitment; Debt; Creditor protection; Inflation; E61; G10; K40;
    All these keywords.

    JEL classification:

    • E61 - Macroeconomics and Monetary Economics - - Macroeconomic Policy, Macroeconomic Aspects of Public Finance, and General Outlook - - - Policy Objectives; Policy Designs and Consistency; Policy Coordination
    • G10 - Financial Economics - - General Financial Markets - - - General (includes Measurement and Data)
    • K40 - Law and Economics - - Legal Procedure, the Legal System, and Illegal Behavior - - - General

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