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Power and Fairness in a Generalized Ultimatum Game

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  • Giovanni Luca Ciampaglia
  • Sergi Lozano
  • Dirk Helbing

Abstract

Power is the ability to influence others towards the attainment of specific goals, and it is a fundamental force that shapes behavior at all levels of human existence. Several theories on the nature of power in social life exist, especially in the context of social influence. Yet, in bargaining situations, surprisingly little is known about its role in shaping social preferences. Such preferences are considered to be the main explanation for observed behavior in a wide range of experimental settings. In this work, we set out to understand the role of bargaining power in the stylized environment of a Generalized Ultimatum Game (GUG). We modify the payoff structure of the standard Ultimatum Game (UG) to investigate three situations: two in which the power balance is either against the proposer or against the responder, and a balanced situation. We find that other-regarding preferences, as measured by the amount of money donated by participants, do not change with the amount of power, but power changes the offers and acceptance rates systematically. Notably, unusually high acceptance rates for lower offers were observed. This finding suggests that social preferences may be invariant to the balance of power and confirms that the role of power on human behavior deserves more attention.

Suggested Citation

  • Giovanni Luca Ciampaglia & Sergi Lozano & Dirk Helbing, 2014. "Power and Fairness in a Generalized Ultimatum Game," PLOS ONE, Public Library of Science, vol. 9(6), pages 1-9, June.
    • Handle: RePEc:plo:pone00:0099039
    DOI: 10.1371/journal.pone.0099039
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    References listed on IDEAS

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    4. Guth, Werner & Tietz, Reinhard, 1990. "Ultimatum bargaining behavior : A survey and comparison of experimental results," Journal of Economic Psychology, Elsevier, vol. 11(3), pages 417-449, September.
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    Cited by:

    1. Rodriguez-Lara, Ismael, 2016. "Equity and bargaining power in ultimatum games," Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization, Elsevier, vol. 130(C), pages 144-165.
    2. Reiji Suzuki & Tomoko Okamoto & Takaya Arita, 2015. "Emergent Dynamics of Fairness in the Spatial Coevolution of Proposer and Responder Species in the Ultimatum Game," PLOS ONE, Public Library of Science, vol. 10(1), pages 1-11, January.
    3. Mohamed I. Gomaa & Stuart Mestelman & Mohamed Shehata, 2014. "Social Distance, Reputation, Risk Attitude, Value Orientation and Equity in Economic Exchanges," Department of Economics Working Papers 2014-07, McMaster University.

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