Hedging Your Bets: Intermediate Movements as Optimal Behavior in the Context of an Incomplete Decision

Existing theories of movement planning suggest that it takes time to select and prepare the actions required to achieve a given goal. These theories often appeal to circumstances where planning apparently goes awry. For instance, if reaction times are forced to be very low, movement trajectories are often directed between two potential targets. These intermediate movements are generally interpreted as errors of movement planning, arising either from planning being incomplete or from parallel movement plans interfering with one another. Here we present an alternative view: that intermediate movements reflect uncertainty about movement goals. We show how intermediate movements are predicted by an optimal feedback control model that incorporates an ongoing decision about movement goals. According to this view, intermediate movements reflect an exploitation of compatibility between goals. Consequently, reducing the compatibility between goals should reduce the incidence of intermediate movements. In human subjects, we varied the compatibility between potential movement goals in two distinct ways: by varying the spatial separation between targets and by introducing a virtual barrier constraining trajectories to the target and penalizing intermediate movements. In both cases we found that decreasing goal compatibility led to a decreasing incidence of intermediate movements. Our results and theory suggest a more integrated view of decision-making and movement planning in which the primary bottleneck to generating a movement is deciding upon task goals. Determining how to move to achieve a given goal is rapid and automatic.Author Summary: Two critical processes need to occur before a movement can be made: identification of the goal of the movement and selection and preparation of the motor commands that will be sent to muscles to generate the movement—in other words, what movement to make, and how to make it. It has long been thought that preparing motor commands is a time-consuming process, and theories advocating this view have pointed to instances where apparently the wrong motor commands are issued if insufficient time is available to prepare them. The usual pattern of these wayward movements is that they are intermediate between two potential targets. In this article we show how such intermediate movements can alternatively be viewed as reflecting an intelligent and deliberate decision about how to move, given uncertainty about task goals. Our theory is supported by experiments that show that intermediate movements only occur in conditions where they are advantageous. The implication of our theory is that the primary bottleneck to generating a movement is deciding on exactly what to do; deciding how to do it is rapid and automatic.