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Economic Policy – State Versus Market Controversy

Author

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  • Kalim Siddiqui

    (University of Huddersfield, United Kingdom)

Abstract

There was a wide ranging debate in the 1950s and 1960s in the developing countries about the role of the state in their economy when these countries attained independence, with developing their economies and eradicating poverty and backwardness being seen as their key priority. In the post-World War II period, the all-pervasive ‘laissez-faire’ model of development was rejected, because during the pre-war period such policies had failed to resolve the economic crisis. Therefore, Keynesian interventionist economic policies were adopted in most of those countries. This is a theoretical paper, which is based on a review of published papers in the field of economic policies, especially about the debate on the role of the state and market. In this study, a wide range of data sources are presented, which includes statistics generated by a number of organisations that are not agencies of a particular government. This is useful since data are compiled by a wide range of organisation such as IMF, World Bank and WTO. Secondary data would help our study to answer the research questions. There seems to be greater potential for examining statistical data produced by various organisations that are relatively independent of the national government.

Suggested Citation

  • Kalim Siddiqui, 2015. "Economic Policy – State Versus Market Controversy," Equilibrium. Quarterly Journal of Economics and Economic Policy, Institute of Economic Research, vol. 10(1), pages 9-32, March.
    • Handle: RePEc:pes:ierequ:v:10:y:2015:i:1:p:9-32
    DOI: 10.12775/EQUIL.2015.001
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    References listed on IDEAS

    as
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    More about this item

    Keywords

    economic policy; ‘market-centric’ model; role of the state; economic governance;
    All these keywords.

    JEL classification:

    • H11 - Public Economics - - Structure and Scope of Government - - - Structure and Scope of Government

    Statistics

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