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When does group chat promote cooperation in shared resource governance?

Author

Listed:
  • Minwoo Ahn

    (University of Arizona
    University of Arizona
    Arizona State University)

  • Raksha Balakrishna

    (Arizona State University
    Arizona State University)

  • Michael Simeone

    (Arizona State University)

  • Marco A. Janssen

    (Arizona State University
    Arizona State University
    Arizona State University)

Abstract

When people use shared resources, overextraction can occur. While deliberation tends to mitigate shared resource exploitation problems, the question remains: under what conditions does group chat improve cooperation in shared resource dilemmas? This study analyzes chat and game data from about 1500 rounds of gameplay involving 143 groups across 4 resource types using Sentiment Analysis and Structural Topic Model. We find that, despite their fundamental differences, the 4 games tend to have similar discussions, including strategizing actions, coordinating choices, and socialization, but they differ in which topics explain cooperation within each game. Discussion topics promoting cooperation include coordination in the foraging game (FOR) and long-term goals in the groundwater game (GG). However, discussion topics negatively associated with cooperation include off-topic/socialization in FOR and the irrigation game (IRR) and crop choice affirmation in GG. We suggest that the context in which communication occurs matters, and biophysical characteristics, rules of the game, and levels of uncertainty explain some variations of our findings.

Suggested Citation

  • Minwoo Ahn & Raksha Balakrishna & Michael Simeone & Marco A. Janssen, 2024. "When does group chat promote cooperation in shared resource governance?," Palgrave Communications, Palgrave Macmillan, vol. 11(1), pages 1-10, December.
  • Handle: RePEc:pal:palcom:v:11:y:2024:i:1:d:10.1057_s41599-024-03992-5
    DOI: 10.1057/s41599-024-03992-5
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